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I. INTRODUCTION
In many detention facilities, officials seek to improve security by
requiring everyone who is detained to submit to some kind of strip
search. 1 In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 2 the Supreme
Court ruled that the Constitution should not be read as imposing “special
restrictions on the searches of offenders suspected of committing minor
offenses once they are taken to jail” and admitted into the general
population. 3
The Florence Court gave several reasons for its conclusion. First, it
said “the seriousness of an offense is a poor predictor of who has
contraband.” 4 Second, “[e]ven if people arrested for a minor offense do
not themselves wish to introduce contraband into a jail, they may be
coerced into doing so by others.” 5 Third, it would be “difficult, as a
practical matter, to classify inmates by their current and prior offenses
before the intake search.” 6
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion observed that the Court
addressed an analogous problem in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 7
where the petitioner had “argued the Fourth Amendment prohibited a
warrantless arrest when . . . [conviction] of the suspected crime ‘could
not ultimately carry any jail time’ and there was ‘no compelling need for

1. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517 (2012). The Court
characterized the actual search at issue as “a close visual inspection while undressed.” Id. at 1513.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1518, 1522 (observing that this question was not addressed in Atwater v. Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), and noting that “[t]his case [Florence] does not require the Court to rule
on the types of searches that would be reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee will be
held without assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other
detainees.”).
4. Id. at 1520.
5. Id. at 1521.
6. Id.
7. 532 U.S. 318.
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immediate detention.’” 8 Such a rule, said the Atwater Court,
“promise[d] very little in the way of administrability.” 9 The Florence
Court expressed similar concerns and emphasized that officers who
interact with those suspected of violating the law have an “essential
interest in readily administrable rules,” and cannot be expected to draw
the proposed lines on a moment’s notice. 10 For all these reasons, the
Florence Court ruled that the suspicionless search procedures at issue
“struck a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of
the institutions.” 11
In terms of security at detention centers, the Court’s reasoning in
Florence is persuasive. The difficulty lies not with the Florence Court’s
balancing of interests once minor offenders arrive at a detention center,
but rather with the Court’s earlier decision in Atwater, that gave police
officers constitutionally “unfettered discretion” to either issue a citation
or to make a custodial arrest for any offense, however minor. 12 Atwater
made it likely that “[p]ersons arrested for minor offenses may be among
the detainees processed at these facilities.”13
Florence is only one of the consequences of Atwater. Because the
authority to search incident to arrest is premised on the fact of a
custodial arrest, 14 Atwater also greatly enlarged the impact of the Court’s
search incident to arrest rules. At the time Atwater was decided, the law
governing searches incident to vehicle stops, laid down in 1981 in New
York v. Belton, 15 allowed a policeman who made “a lawful custodial
arrest of an occupant of an automobile” to make a contemporary search
of the passenger compartment of that automobile incident to that arrest.16
In addition, the officer could impound the vehicle and conduct a
thorough inventory search of the vehicle.17 In 1996, in Whren v. United
States, 18 the Supreme Court held that a traffic stop “is reasonable where
the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred,” even if the traffic stop is a pretext to stop the vehicle for some

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
ruling).
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
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Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1522.
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 350.
Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1522.
Id. at 1523.
See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority’s
Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1517.
See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-26, 235-36 (1973).
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
Id. at. 460.
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987).
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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other reason. 19
The result of Atwater, Belton, and Whren, taken together, was
draconian. It is almost impossible for any motorist to drive any
significant distance without violating one or more traffic laws. Thus,
after Atwater, an officer determined to search a particular motorist
needed only to monitor that person’s driving until, and inevitably, he
committed a violation. The driver could then be taken into custody,
booked, and searched again. 20 His vehicle could be searched incident to
the arrest, impounded, and subjected to an inventory search. 21
Perhaps recognizing the monster it had created, the Court, in
Arizona v. Gant, 22 attempted to scale back the power of law enforcement
officers to search vehicles incident to the custodial arrest of an
occupant. 23 The Court’s efforts, however, made the law of search and
seizure more confusing and are unlikely to have much effect on the
frequency or intensity of searches. After Florence, meaningful limits on
the power to search persons brought into correctional facilities also
require limits on the power to make custodial arrests. Such limitations
could take the form of legislation or regulations, or of a requirement that
police departments adopt rules to guide the discretion of police officers
faced with the decision to issue a citation or make a custodial arrest. A
better approach would be for the Court to overrule Atwater.
Reasonableness and the balancing of interests are the key principles
of the Fourth Amendment. 24 In Atwater, the Court failed to recognize
the profound consequences of a custodial arrest and failed to properly
balance those consequences against the interests served by such an
arrest. Florence allows the police to add another major consequence—a
strip search—to the arrestee’s experience. 25 Atwater also allows the
police officer, in effect, to circumvent the courts and impose the
draconian consequences of a custodial arrest and all that can follow,
thereby imposing a “penalty” that far exceeds the penalty a court could,
or would, impose. These consequences are totally disproportionate to,

19. Id. at 810.
20. See, e.g., Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1983).
21. See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374).
22. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
23. Id. at 351 (holding that “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s
arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest”).
24. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985); see also United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001).
25. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1521-23 (2012).
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and bear no reasonable relation to, the harm the offender and his offense
might have caused. The Atwater Court rejected compelling arguments
for a different result and, instead, reached a result that was contrary to
the intentions of the Framers,26 and which, in a very real sense, totally
nullified the Fourth Amendment in most settings outside the home. 27
This article suggests, inter alia, that Atwater can and should be
limited, or better yet, overruled, by the adoption of reasonableness and
probable cause standards that take into account the seriousness of the
offense and make custodial arrests of minor offenders, and searches
directed at minor offenders, much more difficult to justify than
comparable activities directed at serious offenders.
II. ATWATER V. CITY OF LAGO VISTA
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista arose out of the actions of a police
officer who exercised “extremely poor judgment.” 28 Gail Atwater and
her two children, three and five years old, were riding in the front seat of
her pickup truck without seatbelts. 29 Under Texas law, a front seat
passenger must wear a seat belt and the driver of the vehicle must secure
any small child riding in front. Violation of either provision is a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than fifty dollars. The
officer observed the violations and pulled Atwater over. After some
conversation, he called for backup and handcuffed Atwater. 30 The
officer transported Atwater to the local police station where she was
subsequently booked, photographed and placed “alone, in a jail cell for
about one hour, after which she was . . . released on $310 bond. . . . She
ultimately pleaded no contest to the misdemeanor seatbelt offenses and
paid a $50 fine.” 31
The Court first concluded that the Fourth Amendment, as originally
understood, did not forbid “peace officers to arrest without a warrant for
misdemeanors not amounting to or involving [a] breach of the peace.” 32
The Court then turned to the argument that the custodial arrest of
Atwater was constitutionally unreasonable because the crime for which
26. See David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1739, 1813-14 (2000).
27. See Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case
Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 246-47 (2002).
28. 532 U.S. 318, 346-47 (2001).
29. Id. at 323-24.
30. Id. at 324.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 340.
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she was arrested was “minor,” 33 and held that “[i]f an officer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very
minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the
Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” 34
In Atwater, the Court refused to hold that “the Fourth Amendment
prohibited a warrantless arrest when . . . [conviction] of the suspected
crime ‘could not ultimately carry any jail time’ and there was ‘no
compelling need for immediate detention.’”35 Such a rule, said the
Atwater Court, “promise[d] very little in the way of administrability.” 36
The Court went on to explain:
An officer not quite sure that the drugs weighed enough to warrant jail
time or not quite certain about a suspect’s risk of flight would not
arrest, even though it could perfectly well turn out that, in fact, the
offense called for incarceration and the defendant was long gone on the
37
day of trial.

According to the Court, an officer who erred could face “legal action
challenging the discretionary judgment . . . and the prospect of
evidentiary exclusion.” 38
The Court rejected the idea of resolving this problem with “a
simple tiebreaker for the police to follow in the field: if in doubt do not
arrest.” 39 That approach, said Justice Souter, “would boil down to
something akin to a least-restrictive-alternative limitation . . . generally
thought inappropriate in working out Fourth Amendment protection,”
and would provide a “systematic disincentive”40 for officers to arrest
suspects in circumstances where an arrest would serve important societal
interests. “Multiplied many times over, the costs to society of such
underenforcement could easily outweigh the costs to defendants of being
needlessly arrested and booked.” 41
Justice O’Connor’s dissent observed that “[j]ustifying a full arrest
by the same quantum of evidence that justifies a traffic stop—even
though the offender cannot ultimately be imprisoned for her conduct—
33. The Court said its reasoning applied to any major-minor crime distinction whether a
‘“minor crime’ [is] . . . defined as a fine-only traffic offense, a fine-only offense more generally, or
a misdemeanor.” Id. at 348.
34. Id. at 354.
35. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1522 (2012).
36. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 350.
37. Id. at 351.
38. Id. at 350.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 350-51.
41. Id. at 351.
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defies any sense of proportionality and is in serious tension with the
Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable seizures.” 42 Instead,
said O’Connor,
[W]hen there is probable cause to believe that a fine-only offense has
been committed, the police officer should issue a citation unless the
officer is “able to point to specific and articulable facts, which taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
43
[the additional] intrusion of a full custodial arrest.”

The dissent dismissed the majority’s concerns about lawsuits by
saying that qualified immunity should afford sufficient protection in
most cases. 44 Finally, it observed that the rule the Court created has
potentially serious consequences for the everyday lives of Americans
who are now at the mercy of police officers who have essentially
“unfettered discretion” to stop every motorist whenever they want for
whatever reason they want. 45
III. ATWATER AND SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST
A.

The Extent of the Authority to Search Incident to Arrest

It has long been clear that a police officer who makes a lawful
custodial arrest may, incident to that arrest, conduct a warrantless search
of a person arrested in order to: “remove any weapons that the latter
might seek to use . . . to resist arrest or effect his escape” and “to search
for and seize any evidence . . . to prevent its concealment or
destruction.” 46 In addition, and for the same reasons, a search may be
42. Id. at 364.
43. Id. at 366; see also id. at 365 (“A citation should be used when [arresting for a minor
offense] . . . except when by issuing a citation and releasing the violator, the safety of the public
and/or the violator might be imperiled as in the case of D.W.I.”) (quoting TEXAS DEP’T OF PUB.
SAFETY, STUDENT HANDBOOK, TRAFFIC LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (1999)).
Prior to Atwater several state courts had held unconstitutional custodial arrests for minor
offenses. See, e.g., State v. Hehman, 578 P.2d 527, 528 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (“We hold as a
matter of public policy that custodial arrest for minor traffic violations is unjustified, unwarranted,
and impermissible if the defendant signs the promise to appear . . . .”); see also People v. Clyne, 541
P.2d 71, 72-73 (Colo. 1975) (en banc) (holding that custodial arrest of defendant for hitchhiking
violated statute and search incident thereto was thus improper, but declining to consider its
constitutionality).
44. Atwater, 523 U.S at 367-68 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 372 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
46. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177
(2008) (“The interests justifying search are present whenever an officer makes an arrest. A search
enables officers to safeguard evidence, and, most critically, to ensure their safety during the
‘extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the
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conducted of the area within the arrestee’s “immediate control.”47 Until
recently, if the arrestee was “the occupant of a car, the entire passenger
compartment of the car, including any purse or package inside, [was] . . .
subject to search as well.” 48 If a person is arrested in a room, most of
that room is subject to search. 49 That search might be followed by a
protective sweep of other parts of the building. 50 Moreover, the Court
has said that it is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for
police officers to routinely monitor the movement of a person following
his arrest in a public place even when the arrest is for a minor offense
and even when the monitoring entails accompanying the suspect into his
home. 51
The authority to search a person incident to his arrest, like the
authority to search residents of a detention center, is not altered or
diminished by the fact that the offense for which an arrest is made is
benign or trivial in nature. 52 Moreover, for many years, the right to
search incident to arrest was said not to be expanded or diminished by
the fact that in a particular case the nature of the offense or the nature of
the suspect suggested a greater or lesser likelihood that weapons or
evidence will in fact be found. 53
In rejecting a case-by-case approach to searches incident to arrest in
United States v. Robinson, 54 the Supreme Court emphasized that
traditionally the fact of a lawful custodial arrest necessarily gave rise to
an authority to search incident to that arrest.55 The Robinson Court also
police station’”) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-235 (1973)); see also
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 (the search incident to arrest exception “rests quite as much on the need
to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the need to preserve
evidence.”).
47. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
48. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 364 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing cases).
49. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
50. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
51. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1982) (no constitutional violation where
suspect, a university student, was arrested for carrying a bottle of gin after which officer
accompanied him to his dormitory room to get his identification and, while there, observed
marijuana seeds and a small pipe).
52. See id. at 7; see also Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973). In Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court imposed a special limitation on searches incident to
arrest that result in bodily intrusions. Though the offense under investigation in Schmerber was
relatively minor, this factor does not seem to have played any role in the Court’s decision.
53. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); cf. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332 (2009).
54. 414 U.S. 218.
55. Id. at 224-26, 235-36. In at least five places the Robinson Court observed that a fullcustodial or custodial arrest was at issue. In a footnote, the Court observed that the court below had
distinguished this from a full traffic stop and described a custodial arrest as an arrest where an
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recognized that “the danger to an officer [that flows from] . . . the
extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody
and transporting him to the police station,” 56 does not directly correlate
with the seriousnessness of the crime for which a person is being
arrested. 57 Though some offenses are such that by their very nature no
evidence of their commission is likely to be found, there is no easy way
to infer whether a particular arrestee is in fact armed and/or dangerous. 58
Like the Court in Florence, the Robinson Court realized that even if one
could safely assume that persons arrested for certain offenses are more
or less likely to be armed than other offenders, this says little about a
particular offender. 59 Given the difficulties inherent in case-by-case
adjudication and “the relatively minor intrusion” 60 that the search
constitutes “on a person who, by hypothesis, has already been subjected
to the more serious step of arrest,” 61 officer safety “is an adequate basis
for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search
justification.” 62
The Court has also used a uniform, one-size-fits-all approach in
dealing with most post-arrest station house searches of arrestees and

officer “arrest[s] a subject and subsequently transport[s] him to a police facility for booking.” Id. at
221 n.2. See also Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 263-66 (emphasizing that a custodial arrest was the
necessary predicate for a search incident to arrest).
56. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35.
57. See e.g., Id. at 234-35; Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 265-67. See also 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 5.2 at 105 (West Publ’g Co.
4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE].
58. See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 5.2 at 111-112.
59. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 n.5 (noting that thirty percent of “shootings of police officers
occur when an officer stops a person in an automobile”).
60. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 776 (1969).
61. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.5(b) at 145 (2d ed.
1992) [hereinafter LAFAVE & ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]; see also Robinson, 414 U.S. at 23537.
62. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (“[I]n the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the
person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement . . . [i]t is also a ‘reasonable’ search
under that Amendment.”).
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court held that blood could not be
involuntarily withdrawn from a motorist in order to test it for alcohol content, on the theory that this
was a search of the motorist’s body incident to his arrest. Id. at 769-70. The Court observed that
the considerations that ordinarily justify a search incident to arrest “have little applicability with
respect to searches involving intrusions beyond the body’s surface.” Id. at 769. “The interests in
human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects” require “a clear indication” that
the intrusion will turn up evidence of intoxication. Id. at 767-68.
In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540 (1985), the Court referred
to Schmerber’s “clear indication” language as the equivalent of a particularized suspicion and
specifically rejected the idea that it referred to a third level of certainty between reasonable
suspicion and probable cause. Interestingly, the Florence Court did not cite Hernandez.
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their belongings. 63 The Court has stated that “[i]t is immaterial whether
the police actually fear any particular package or container; the need to
protect against [the risks of theft, false claims of theft, and weapons]
arises independent of a particular officer’s subjective concerns [about a
particular item].” 64 However, prior to Florence, some lower court cases
had suggested strip searches and body cavity searches were
unreasonable when directed at persons in custody for minor offenses.65
B.

The Requirement of a Custodial Arrest

The Supreme Court has premised the authority to search incident to
arrest on the fact of a custodial arrest. In United States v. Robinson, the
Court observed in at least five places in the text of its opinion that a full
custody or custodial arrest was at issue. 66 In a footnote, the Supreme
Court observed that the court below had distinguished this from a full
traffic stop and described a custodial arrest as one where an officer
“arrest[s] a subject and subsequently transport[s] him to a police facility
for booking.” 67 Similarly, in Gustafson v. Florida, 68 the Court
emphasized that a custodial arrest was the necessary predicate for a
search incident to arrest.69
The same emphasis on custodial arrests appears in most of the
63. See, e.g., Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (holding that “it is not
‘unreasonable’ for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested
person, to search any container or article in his possession, in accordance with established inventory
procedures.”); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974) (holding that a search which
would have been proper if made incident to an arrest is also proper if made at the station house).
64. LaFayette, 462 U.S. at 646.
65. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1530 (2012) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (citing cases); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983)
(“[T]he strip searches bore an insubstantial relationship to security needs so that, when balanced
against plaintiffs-appellees’ privacy interests, the searches cannot be considered ‘reasonable’”);
Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 742 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[S]ecurity cannot justify the blanket
deprivation of rights of the kind incurred here.”); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir.
1981) (strip search of jailed DWI suspect was unreasonable and unconstitutional because it “bore no
such discernible relationship to security needs at the Detention Center . . . when balanced against
the ultimate invasion of personal rights involved”), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 90 (1982); see also Hill v.
Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 393-95 (10th Cir. 1984) (following Logan and holding unreasonable a strip
search of a driver who was arrested on an outstanding bench warrant—which had apparently been
withdrawn—relating to a speeding ticket).
66. 414 U.S. at 234-236.
67. Id. at 221 n.2. The Court of Appeals, 471 F.2d 1082, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1972), had held
that “the permissible scope of searches incident to routine traffic arrests . . . where the officer
intends simply to issue a notice of violation and to allow the offender to proceed, must be governed
by the teaching of the Supreme Court as set forth in Terry.”
68. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
69. Id. at 263-66.
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Court’s opinions involving the extent of the area that may be searched
incident to his arrest. 70 Although these references suggest an attempt to
establish a meaningful line between custodial arrests and situations
where an offender is merely given a ticket, summons, or notice to
appear, 71 it is not clear beyond doubt that the Court intended the use of
the word “custodial” to operate as a limitation on searches incident to
arrest. 72 However, there are sound reasons for limiting searches incident
to arrest to custodial arrests. First, if an arrest is not custodial, a search
incident to that arrest is not a “relatively minor intrusion . . . on a person
who by hypothesis has already been subjected to the more serious step of
arrest;” 73 it is a major intrusion added to a relatively minor annoyance.
Second, most offenses for which citations are issued are of such a nature
that no evidence of their commission exists to be found. 74 Third, noncustodial arrests pose less danger to the arresting officer because the
officer is only briefly in contact with a suspect who knows he will soon
be free to go and who thus has a diminished incentive to destroy
evidence or resort to force. 75 Fourth, even though many police officers
have been injured in the course of traffic stops,76 those injuries often
take place as the officer approaches the vehicle and before any search
could occur. Fifth, when a suspect is not being taken into custody there
is no need to search his person in order to ensure that weapons or
70. See, e.g., Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 6-8 & n.3 (1982) (referring to the
arresting officer’s need to “maintain custody over the arrested person” and the “arresting officer’s
custodial authority”); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (referring to the right of a
policeman who makes “a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile” to make a
contemporary search of the passenger compartment of that automobile incident to that arrest).
71. See Wayne R. LaFave, “Seizure” Typology, Classifying Detentions of the Person To
Resolve Warrant, Grounds, and Search Issues, 17 MICH. J. L. REF. 417, 440 (1984).
72. Courts have, for some time, recognized a difference between custodial arrests and arrests
made by means of a ticket or a summons. See, e.g., People v. Dandrea, 736 P.2d 1211, 1215 n.7
(Colo. 1987) (en banc) (distinguishing between protective custody and custodial arrests and stating
that “[a]n arrest of a person upon probable cause of having committed a crime for the purpose of
taking the person to police facilities for booking is considered a ‘custodial arrest.’”); Pittman v.
State, 541 So. 2d 583, 585 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (a traffic stop and “requiring a motorist to sit in a
patrol car while the officer completes [a ticket] does not constitute a custodial arrest.”). See also
Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 266 (noting several times that defendant was searched incident to his
“custodial arrest”); Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236 n.6 (emphasizing that search was incident to a full
custody arrest as opposed to the simple issuance of a notice of violation); cf. Robbins v. California,
453 U.S. 420, 450 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I am not familiar with any difference between
custodial arrests and any other kind of arrests.”).
73. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 61, § 3.5(b) at 145; cf. Robinson,
414 U.S. at 256-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that even in the context of a custodial arrest,
the additional intrusion of a search incident thereto is significant).
74. See, e.g., Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 115, 118 (1998) (speeding).
75. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35; see also Knowles, 525 U.S. at 117.
76. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 n.5.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 2
ARTICLE 2 - SCHROEDER (DO NOT DELETE)

342

4/5/2013 6:40 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[46:331

contraband are not brought into the officer’s squad car or into a custodial
facility. 77
Recognizing the force of many of these arguments, the Court held
in Knowles v. Iowa 78 that there is no right to search incident to arrest if
an officer stops a vehicle and only issues a ticket or citation summons. 79
As an alternative, officers may:
order out of a vehicle both the driver, and any passengers, perform a
“patdown” of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion
that they may be armed and dangerous; conduct a “Terry patdown” of
the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that
an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a
80
weapon.

It is likely that the Court would reach the same result if faced with a
case where an individual, not in a vehicle, were stopped and given a
citation or ticket.81 Here again, a Terry-type frisk for weapons 82 should
be all that is necessary. 83
C.

The Effect of Atwater on Search Incident to Arrest Law

When Atwater was decided, the law governing searches incident to
vehicle stops, laid down in 1981 in New York v. Belton, allowed a
policeman who made “a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile” to make a contemporary search of the passenger
compartment of that automobile incident to that arrest.84 In addition, the

77. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177 (2008) (“Officers issuing citations do not face the
same danger and we therefore held in Knowles . . . that they do not have the same authority to
search . . . .”).
78. 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
79. See id. at 118-119.
80. See id. at 117 (citations omitted) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967)).
81. Cf. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (noting that a person not under formal
arrest “might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps
to destroy incriminating evidence on his person.”).
82. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (“[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, . . . he is entitled
for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.”).
83. See, e.g., People v. Clyne, 541 P.2d 71, 72-74 (Colo. 1975) (where defendant was
charged with hitchhiking, the court reaffirmed, in light of Robinson and Gustafson, a Colorado rule
that searches incident to arrests for minor traffic or municipal offenses must be limited to protective
pat downs for weapons when the officer reasonably believes the suspect is armed and dangerous).
84. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
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officer could impound the vehicle and inventory all of its contents. 85
In Delaware v. Prouse, 86 the Court held that absent reasonable
suspicion, police officers may not stop motorists to check their driver’s
licenses or registration or use other methods that involve the exercise of
“standardless and unconstrained” discretion. 87 However, in Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz, 88 the court held that sobriety
checkpoints where every vehicle is stopped are constitutionally
permissible. 89 In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 90 the Court declared
unconstitutional the use of vehicle checkpoints to interdict drugs or to
obtain evidence of ordinary criminality unrelated to the use of the
highways. 91 Despite these restrictions, on average, approximately 18
million drivers are stopped by the police each year throughout the
United States. 92 That number would be higher if the police did not
choose to ignore the vast majority of minor violations.
There is no way to know how many of these stops were truly made
only because of a traffic violation.93 However, in 1996, in Whren v.
United States, 94 the Supreme Court held that a traffic stop “is reasonable
where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation
has occurred” even if the traffic stop is a pretext to stop the vehicle for

85. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S 318, 372 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987)).
86. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
87. Id. at 663 (suggesting that it would be permissible to stop all on-coming drivers at a
roadblock in order to check their licenses and registrations).
88. 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990).
89. Id. 454-55 (looking at the serious consequences of drunk driving and the number of
violators apprehended as a percentage of the cars stopped, and balancing the state’s interest in
preventing drunken driving and the system’s efficacy in advancing that interest against “the degree
of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped.”).
90. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
91. Id. at 41-48 (noting that “the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an
appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous
criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route”); cf. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260,
267-74 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding, under the special needs doctrine, the constitutionality of New
York City’s program of random, suspicionless, subway baggage searches).
92. In 1999, it is estimated that 19.3 million drivers were stopped by police. ERICA L.
SCHMIDT, PATRICK A. LANGAN, PH.D. & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, CHARACTERISTICS OF DRIVERS STOPPED BY POLICE, 1999 (Mar. 2002). In
2002, that number fell to about 17 million. ERICA L. SCHMIDT & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, CHARACTERISTICS OF DRIVERS STOPPED BY THE
POLICE, 2002 (June 2006) [hereinafter CHARACTERISTICS OF DRIVERS STOPPED BY THE POLICE,
2002].
93. In 2002, eighty-three percent of drivers who were stopped felt they were pulled over for a
legitimate reason. CHARACTERISTICS OF DRIVERS STOPPED BY POLICE, 2002, supra note 92.
94. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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some other reason. 95
The result of Atwater, Belton, and Whren, taken together, was
draconian. Because it is almost impossible for any motorist to drive any
significant distance without running afoul of one or more traffic laws,96
Whren rendered largely meaningless Prouse’s limitations on suspicionless, random, stops. 97 In practice, any motorist can be stopped at almost
any time. By giving police officers constitutionally unfettered discretion
to either issue a citation or to make a custodial arrest after a stop based
on probable cause, Atwater also rendered largely meaningless Knowles’
bar on searches incident to a citation-only stop.
Before Atwater, an officer who wanted to make a custodial arrest to
gain access to a stopped vehicle was constrained by the uncertainty of
whether his or her actions were constitutional. In some states, the officer
was also constrained by state law. 98 After Atwater and Whren, it was
clear that there are no constitutional constraints on vehicle stops except
probable cause. Now, there is always the “possibility that a police
officer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search warrant, will use a
traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct a search.” 99
An officer determined to investigate a particular individual need
only monitor that individual’s driving until he inevitably commits a
violation. 100 If the officer has constitutionally unfettered discretion to
either issue a citation or make a custodial arrest, the requirement of a
custodial arrest as a predicate to a search incident to arrest does not limit
the arresting officer’s authority—it increases the scope of his or her

95. Id. at 810, 815.
96. Id. at 818 (1996); State v. Robinson, 447 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Mo. 1969) (Seiler, P. J.,
concurring in the result) (“Few drivers . . . can drive any considerable distance without violating
some traffic law or ordinance.”).
97. Despite the difficulties in determining whether a stop was pretextual, prior to Whren
some courts made the effort. See, e.g., Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir.
1961) (“Where the arrest is only a sham or a front being used as an excuse for making a search, the
arrest itself and the ensuing search are illegal.”); Blazak v. Eyman, 339 F. Supp. 40, 41-43 (D. Ariz.
1971) (following Taglavore and finding Fourth Amendment violation where officers did not stop
defendant whose driver’s license they knew was suspended until they suspected he had narcotics in
his possession and then arrested him for that offense but did not arrest him for the traffic offense).
98. See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 352 (2001) (citing statutes).
99. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 773 (2001) (Ginsberg J., concurring) (quoting
opinion of the Arkansas Supreme Court, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552 (Ark. 2000), where that court
expressed its “unwillingness ‘to sanction conduct where a police officer can trail a targeted vehicle
with a driver merely suspected of criminal activity, wait for the driver to exceed the speed limit by
one mile per hour, arrest the driver for speeding, and conduct a full-blown inventory search of the
vehicle with impunity.’”).
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discretion. 101 The officer can stop the driver and proceed essentially as
he or she chooses. If the officer only wants to search the car, but does
not necessarily want to take the driver into custody, the officer can seek
consent to search the vehicle. If that fails, “[a]ll the officer has to do is
announce his intention to arrest and . . . conduct a full search of the
person and his belongings and vehicle, . . . [if nothing is] found, the
officer can then ‘change his mind’ and issue a citation.” 102 The officer
who proceeds in this manner may also search any other person’s
belongings that happen to be in the vehicle.103 Alternatively, the officer
can search the vehicle, impound it, conduct another (inventory) search,
and transport the driver to a detention center where he and his
belongings can be searched and he can be held up to forty-eight hours
without seeing a judge. 104 Eventually, if he is released into the general
jail or prison population, the driver can be strip-searched. 105
More questions are raised by cases such as Berkemer v. McCarty, 106
where the Court said that the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a socalled Terry stop, than to a formal arrest.107 If this is true, a search
incident to that stop/arrest would not be permitted. However, in a
footnote the Berkemer Court said, “We of course do not suggest that a
traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set
by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.” 108 Just what
this means is not clear. However, if a custodial arrest, and all that
follows, is, after Atwater, permissible after a traffic stop on probable
cause, anything less should be permissible as well on the theory that the
greater necessarily includes the lesser. Subsequent cases have, for the
most part, finessed this question. 109
101. Cf. People v. Corral, 498 N.E.2d 287, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (absent evidence of “a
more serious crime . . . a mere traffic stop cannot justify a full search of a defendant’s vehicle.”).
102. Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in
Atwater v. Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 334 (2002). A search incident to arrest may
occur before the arrest. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980) (“Where the
formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner’s person, we do
not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.”);
People v. Avila, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1069, 1076 (1997) (“[I]t is unimportant whether a search incident
to an arrest precedes the arrest or vice versa”).
103. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (“Passengers, no less than drivers,
possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property they transport in cars.”).
104. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 364, 371 (2001) (O’Connor, J. dissenting); see also
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-59 (1991).
105. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517 (2012).
106. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
107. Id. at 439.
108. Id. at 439 n.29.
109. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); see also Arizona v. United States, 132
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Perhaps recognizing the monster it had created, the Court tried in
Arizona v. Gant to scale back the power of law enforcement officers to
search vehicles incident to the custodial arrest of an occupant.110 In
doing so, the Court rejected a rule that was clear and had been widely
taught in police academies for twenty-eight years. Under the new rule,
“[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only
if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment
at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest.” 111
Gant raised many more questions than it answered,112 and made the
law of search and seizure more confusing. It will lead to endless
litigation and occasional lost evidence until its contours and effects are
clarified. Yet, when all is said and done, it is unlikely to have much
effect in preserving privacy, in part because it can be easily
circumvented by impounding the stopped vehicle and conducting an
inventory search of its contents.
Meaningful limits on the power to search incident to arrest require
limitations on the power to make custodial arrests.113 After Florence,
meaningful limits on the power to search persons brought into
correctional facilities also require limits on the power to make custodial
arrests.

S. Ct. 2492, 2529 (2012) (“An investigative stop, if prolonged, can become an arrest and thus
require probable cause”); see also State v. Tucker, 595 P.2d 1364, 1370-71 (1979) (holding that
temporary two-hour detention at police station of defendant who was stopped for riding his bicycle
through a stop sign was reasonable—under statute which authorized citation or full custody arrest—
to determine offender’s identity); cf. United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 491-93 (6th Cir. 2010)
(rejecting a no prolongation rule in traffic stop cases but observing that such a rule is arguably
necessary to prevent abuse of the wide discretion to stop errant motorists that police officers already
enjoy under Whren); Layton City v. Oliver, 139 P.3d 281, 285-86 (Utah 2006) (the reasonableness
of a detention depends, in part, on the seriousness of the offense being investigated, but three and a
half hours was too long where motorist was stopped for non-functioning brake light).
110. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
111. Id. at 351.
112. See YALE KAMISAR, ET AL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 405-407 & nn.1-5 (asking
rhetorically some of questions raised by Gant) (13th ed. 2012) [hereinafter KAMISAR ET AL,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE].
113. See State v. Dangerfield, 795 A.2d 250, 260 (N.J. 2002) (“[T]he Rule modification
authorized by this opinion will diminish the frequency of custodial arrests for [certain] . . .
offense[s] and therefore reduce . . . the frequency of searches related to such arrests”); see also
Thomas R. Folk, The Case for Constitutional Constraints Upon The Power to Make Full Custody
Arrests, 48 U. CINN. L. REV. 321 (1979); Arthur Mendelson, Arrests for Minor Traffic Violations,
19 CRIM. L. BULL. 501, 503 (1983).
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IV. LIMITING THE IMPACT OF ATWATER 114
Limits on the power of the police to make custodial arrests and to
conduct strip searches could be imposed through legislation, or by rules
limiting police departments in the exercise of their discretion. Limits
could also take the form of a variable probable cause standard which
makes actions directed at minor offenders more difficult, but makes
actions directed against extremely serious offenders easier. Finally,
Atwater could be limited, or overruled, by a new assessment of
constitutional reasonableness.
A.

Limiting the Power to Make Custodial Arrests Through Legislation

In Atwater, the Court observed that some states had statutes
limiting warrantless arrests for some minor offenses, 115 and said it is
easier to impose a minor offense limitation on custodial arrests by statute
than to derive it from the constitution. Moreover, said the Court, it is in
the interest of the police to limit such arrests because they are time
consuming and costly and divert officers from other tasks. 116
Legislation, however, has proven difficult to enact. “For example, in
Texas, following the Atwater decision, a bill limiting arrests in minor
cases passed the legislature despite great police opposition, but was then
vetoed by the Governor in response to further police pressure.” 117 In any
event, any legislation will have less force after Virginia v. Moore, 118
where the Court made it clear that a state law constraint was not the
equivalent of a constitutional constraint. 119 Limits on the power to make
custodial arrests could also be achieved through state court rules120 and
through state court judicial interpretations of state constitutional

114. Because Atwater dealt with a misdemeanor, it could be argued that ordinance violations,
infractions, civil offenses, and the like are exempt from its reach.
115. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 352 (2001) (citing statutes); see also OHIO REV.
CODE § 2935.26 (West 2013).
116. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352.
117. Frase, supra note 102, at 415 (citing Michelle Deitich, Veto Risks Texans’ Civil Rights,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 1, 2001, at 5J).
118. 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
119. Id. at 172-78 (where custodial arrest was made in violation of state law that allowed only
a summons (VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74 (West 2013)) evidence found in the course of a search
incident to that illegal arrest was not rendered inadmissible by the Fourth Amendment).
120. See, e.g., State v. Dangerfield, 795 A.2d 250, 260 (N.J. 2002) (“the Rule modification
authorized by this opinion will diminish the frequency of custodial arrests for [certain] . . .
offense[s] and therefore reduce . . . the frequency of searches related to such arrests”): Frase, supra
note 102, at 413 (citing MINN R. CRIM. P. 6.01(1) and MINN. R. CRIM. P. 3.01).
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provisions. 121
Prior to Florence, some courts had held strip searches of persons
detained for minor offenders unconstitutional.122 Some states had
banned them by statute.123 Now they seem likely to become the norm, at
least where a detainee is placed in a facility’s general population.124
B.

Limiting Custodial Arrests by a Constitutional Requirement That
Police Follow Standardized Procedures in Deciding When to Make
Custodial Arrests for Minor Offenses

The Atwater Court rejected the idea of “a simple tiebreaker for the
police to follow . . . : if in doubt do not arrest,” because, inter alia, it
“would boil down to something akin to a least-restrictive-alternative
limitation . . . generally thought inappropriate in working out Fourth
Amendment protection.” 125 Often, when the Court has rejected a least
intrusive alternative requirement, it has instead required that officers
follow standardized procedures. 126 The Atwater Court, however, gave
121. Frase, supra note 102, at 414 (citing State v. Bauer, 36 P.2d 892 (Mont. 2001) and State
v. Brown, 792 N.E.2d 175, 179 (Ohio 2003)).
122. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1530 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing cases).
123. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing statutes); see, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-1(c)
(West 2013) (“No person arrested for a traffic, regulatory, or misdemeanor offense, except in cases
involving weapons or a controlled substance, shall be strip searched . . . .”).
124. The Florence Court noted that the case before it did “not require the Court to rule on the
types of searches that would be reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee [whose
detention has not yet been reviewed by a magistrate or other judicial officer] will be held without
assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other detainees.”
Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1522-23 (observing that “[t]his describes the circumstances in Atwater . . .
where [o]fficers took Atwater’s ‘mug shot’ and placed her, alone, in a jail cell for about one hour,
after which she was taken before a magistrate and released on $310 bond.”).
125. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 350 (2001).
126. See, e.g., Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1983) (holding that it was “not
‘unreasonable’ for police as part of the routine procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested
person, to search any container or article in his possession, in accordance with established inventory
procedures” and stating that it was unnecessary to consider whether less intrusive procedures could
be used to achieve the state’s goals because “standardized inventory procedures are appropriate to
serve the legitimate governmental interest at stake here.”); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374
(1987) (holding that an inventory of a van after the driver was arrested for driving while under the
influence and before the van was taken to an impoundment lot was proper and stating that “[t]he
reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the
existence of alternative ‘less intrusive’ means. . . . [Instead,] reasonable police regulations relating
to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment.”) (quoting
LaFayette, 462 U.S. at 647); Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S 1, 4-5 (1990) (invalidating an inventory of a
locked suitcase found in an impounded vehicle because “the Florida Highway patrol had no policy
whatever with respect to the opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory search,”
and suggesting that it did not matter what the policy was; it only mattered that there be a policy.).
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the police unbridled discretion to choose between custodial and noncustodial responses when making arrests. 127
Any time an officer has probable cause he or she must make
choices. These include whether to ignore or stop the offender and
whether to warn him or arrest him. The decision whether to give the
offender a citation or make a custodial arrest is one more discretionary
call “along the continuum from arrest to incarceration.” 128 Not all of
these choices can be governed by rules; the officer must have some
discretion to make decisions on the street.
The Supreme Court has been unenthusiastic about giving officers
unfettered discretion in making choices. 129 However, the Court has
distinguished independent legal concepts that directly relate to the
suppression of crime (such as the decision to arrest) from incidental
procedures (such as inventory searches) following a lawful arrest,130 and
has allowed the police to exercise more discretion where their choices
involve independent legal concepts but less discretion where their
choices involve incidental procedures. The decision to turn an arrest
into a custodial arrest is somewhere along the continuum from a purely
law enforcement related decision such as the decision to arrest and an
administrative choice such as the decision about what things to
inventory.
Whether the decision to make a custodial arrest can fairly be
characterized as incidental or not, it “carries with it grave potential for

127. Cf. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 366 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (proposing a rule that “when there
is probable cause to believe that a fine-only offense has been committed, the police officer should
issue a citation unless the officer is ‘able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion’ of a
full custodial arrest.”).
128. Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644.
129. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 221 (1981) (“An arrest warrant, [if] . . .
invoked as authority to enter the homes of third parties, . . . [is l]ike a writ of assistance. . . . [It]
specifies only the object of a search— . . . and leaves to the unfettered discretion of the police the
decision as to which particular homes should be searched. We do not believe that the Framers of
the Fourth Amendment would have condoned such a result.”); Texas v. Brown, 443 U.S. 47, 51
(1979) (stating that the Court’s “central concern in balancing . . . competing considerations [relating
to the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances
the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty] in a variety of [Fourth
Amendment] settings has been to assure that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not
subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.”); Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (the decision to stop a vehicle may not depend solely on
“standardless and unconstrained discretion”).
130. See, e.g., Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644 (“A so-called inventory search is not an independent
legal concept but rather an incidental administrative step following arrest and preceding
incarceration.”).
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abuse.” 131 An officer’s decision to exercise his discretion to make a
custodial arrest should be guided by standardized procedures to ensure
that the discretion does not turn into an occasion for harassment, pretextual, or discriminatory activities.132
C.

Limiting Atwater by Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into
Probable Cause Equations

In Devenpeck v. Alford, 133 decided after Atwater, the Supreme
Court said, “a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a
criminal offense has been or is being committed.”134 In effect, this is the
approach the Court took in Atwater. Probable cause, however, is not a
self-defining term. Like many legal concepts, it is a far easier term to
articulate than to define. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has
said that probable cause is “a single familiar standard.” 135 However, it
is, at most, a single familiar phrase; its meaning is neither single nor
familiar. 136
131. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“as the recent debate over racial
profiling demonstrates . . . a relatively minor traffic infraction may often serve as an excuse for
stopping and harassing an individual”).
132. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be
based on specific, objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate interests require the seizure of
the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying
explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.”); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.
367, 376-77 (1987) (Marshall J., dissenting) (“[W]e have consistently emphasized the need for . . .
set procedures: ‘standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when
in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at
least to some extent.’”).
133. 543 U.S. 146 (2004).
134. Id. at 153.
135. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979) (“A single familiar standard [of
probable cause] is essential to guide police officers.”).
136. See Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 97678 (2003) (discussing the realities surrounding these terms).
Confusion surrounding the meaning of probable cause is increased by the use of that
phrase in many non-Fourth Amendment settings. For example, probable cause is sometimes
said to be necessary before a defendant will be bound over at a preliminary hearing. See, e.g.,
People v. Riddle, 489 N.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (stating that “[t]he purpose of a
preliminary hearing is to ensure that a criminal defendant is not held without a prompt
showing of probable cause” and adding that a “judicial determination of probable cause as a
prerequisite to an extended restraint of liberty following an arrest is required by the Fourth
Amendment”) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975)).
Some courts have defined preliminary hearing probable cause as essentially
identical to Fourth Amendment probable cause. See, e.g., People v. Nygren, 696 P.2d 270,
272 (Colo. 1985) (“The . . . preliminary hearing . . . probable cause standard requires only that
the prosecution present evidence sufficient to persuade a person of ordinary prudence and
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By its terms, the Fourth Amendment commands that “no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” 137 In addition, the Supreme
Court has held that probable cause is a prerequisite to certain warrantless
searches and seizures. 138
Courts and commentators have occasionally expressed the view that
the seriousness of the offense under investigation should be relevant in
determining the existence of probable cause.139 Whether this should be
so is a complex and difficult question whose answer turns, in the first
instance, on the nature of probable cause.
1. The Nature of Probable Cause
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, several individual Supreme Court
Justices suggested, 140 and the Court sometimes held, that probable cause
caution to a reasonable belief that the defendant committed the crimes charged.”). However,
Fourth Amendment probable cause does not require the same “evidence of each element of the
offense as would be needed to support a conviction.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149
(1972). It also “does not involve speculation about the outcome of a trial on the merits.”
United States v. Atkinson, 450 F.2d 835, 838 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc). Thus, the preliminary
hearing standard for probable cause is necessarily different from that applicable in search and
seizure settings. See, e.g., Williams v. Kobel, 789 F.2d 463, 467-69 (7th Cir. 1986)
(interpreting Illinois law and observing that “[a] finding of no probable cause at a preliminary
hearing, therefore, may very well be made, and often is made, even though there was probable
cause to arrest the defendant.”); State v. Berby, 260 N.W.2d 798, 801 (Wisc. 1978) (“The
probable cause that is required for a bindover is greater than that required for the issuance of
an arrest warrant, but guilt beyond a reasonable doubt need not be proven”).
Because the preliminary hearing is directed in part toward screening out cases where
prosecution is not warranted, the court’s determination there is roughly analogous to a trial
judge’s ruling on a motion for a directed verdict. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9
(1970); see also Myers v. Commonwealth, 298 N.E.2d 819, 823-24 (Mass. 1973);
Commonwealth v. Lacey, 496 A.2d 1256, 1260 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). Consequently, it is
more accurate to say that a prima facie case, sufficient if unrebutted to warrant conviction, is
required. See, e.g., Lacey, 496 A.2d at 1260.
The term probable cause has also been used in the grand jury setting. See, e.g., 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/112-4 (d) (West 2012) (indictment should be returned if evidence
before grand jury establishes “probable cause that a person has committed an offense”).
However, generally, a prima facie case, not probable cause, is required before a grand jury can
return an indictment. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.8 (West 2013).
137. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976) (probable cause is required
for a warrantless arrest in a public place).
139. See, e.g, Edward L. Barrett Jr., Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth
Amendment, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 46 (1960); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565-66 (7th Cir.
1985).
140. See, e.g., Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 464 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that “searches conducted in the middle of the night involve a greater intrusion than
ordinary searches and therefore [the constitution may] require a greater justification”); Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 69 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The standard of reasonableness
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is a concept which could vary with the magnitude of the intrusion and
with the interests at issue. 141 By 1987, though, the Court had moved
away from the variable probable cause concept. Instead, it separated out
“probable cause” for “administrative warrants,” where “we use [the term
probable cause] as referring not to a quantum of evidence, but merely to
a requirement of reasonableness,” 142 and contrasted this use with the
more usual use of “probable cause” in criminal cases to “refer to a
quantum of evidence for the belief justifying the search, to be
distinguished from a lesser quantum such as ‘reasonable suspicion.’” 143
Having separated out the administrative search cases, the Court tried to
move toward a uniform and fixed view of probable cause in criminal
cases. 144 Despite these efforts, however, probable cause remains “an
exceedingly difficult concept to objectify.” 145
Traditional probable cause in criminal cases—the kind of probable
cause necessary to obtain what the Court has termed a judicial

embodied in the Fourth Amendment demands that the showing of justification match the degree of
intrusion. By its very nature electronic eavesdropping for a 60-day period, even of a specified
office, involves a broad invasion of a constitutionally protected area. Only the most precise and
rigorous standard of probable cause should justify an intrusion of this sort.”).
141. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978) (“The showing of probable cause necessary
to secure a warrant may vary with the object and intrusiveness of the search.”); see also Marshall v.
Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978) (probable cause for an administrative search may be
based on evidence of specific violations or on a showing that the proposed search comports with a
legislative scheme); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530, 538 (1967) (holding that
because a building inspection is “a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman’s search . . .
probable cause to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied.”).
142. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 538-39 (holding that certain kinds of administrative searches
could be conducted on the basis of a type of probable cause which was different from the probable
cause ordinarily required to conduct a search or seizure). The Camara Court’s use of the phrase
“probable cause” may have stemmed from an underlying desire to require a warrant. Once
committed to requiring the warrant the Court saw no escape, given the Fourth Amendment’s
language, from holding that the warrant could only issue upon a showing of probable cause.
143. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 n.4 (1987) (distinguishing Camara and
Barlow’s Inc). Although Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967), relied heavily on Camara, Terry did not
adopt a lesser standard of probable cause, but instead held that some Fourth Amendment activities,
particularly those not subjected to the warrant requirement, are not subject to the probable cause
requirement. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20; see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (“The Terry
case created an exception to the requirement of probable cause”).
144. See, e.g., New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868, 875 & n.6 (1986) (holding that “an
application for a warrant authorizing the seizure of materials presumptively protected by the First
Amendment should be evaluated under the same standard of probable cause used to review warrant
applications generally” and rejecting the argument that a “‘higher’ standard of probable cause”
should apply to warrants directed at the seizure of books and films).
145. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 3.2 at 24 (quoting Cook, Probable
Cause To Arrest, 24 VAND. L. REV. 317 (1971)).
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warrant 146—has been defined from four perspectives. First, probable
cause has often been defined in terms of the mental state of the police
officer about to engage in, or the judicial officer deciding whether to
authorize, a Fourth Amendment activity. Second, probable cause has
frequently been defined in terms of probabilities. Third, probable cause
has often been said to be “‘the best compromise that has been found for
accommodating [the] often opposing interests’ in ‘safeguard[ing]
citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy’ and ‘in
seek[ing] to give fair leeway for enforcing the law.’”147 More than one
of these definitions has appeared in the same case148 and all of them
seem to be encompassed within a fourth definition, the totality of the
circumstances, that is the overarching standard. Looking at each of
these as a separate test reveals that the seriousness of the offense impacts
differently on each.
2. Definitions of Probable Cause
a. Probable Cause as a Mental State
Probable cause has often been defined in terms of the state of mind
that should be possessed by a police officer about to engage in, or a
judicial officer about to authorize, a Fourth Amendment activity.
Frequently, it has been said that “[t]he substance of all the definitions of
probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.”149 That belief

146. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2011) (referring to “a properly
issued judicial warrant”); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877-78 (referring to “constitutionally mandated
judicial warrants” and distinguishing them from administrative warrants).
147. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
148. Occasional decisions acknowledge that there is more than one test for probable cause.
See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 435 n.1 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring
to objective and subjective standards of probable cause). Whatever the precise standard, it is clear
that the probable cause determination is significantly different from trial type fact-finding efforts.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the probable cause determination is ex parte. In addition, Fourth
Amendment probable cause does not require the same “evidence of each element of the offense as
would be needed to support a conviction.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972). Finally,
“a finding of ‘probable cause’ may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal
trial.” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107-08 (1969) (citing cases); Brinegar, 338 U.S. at
174, n.12 (“the ordinary rules of evidence are generally not applied in ex parte proceedings”); Gray
v. State, 507 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (“[I]nformation which would be
inadmissible at trial on hearsay grounds may be used to show probable cause”), cert. denied, 507
So. 2d 1026 (Ala. 1987) (quoting 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, at 469).
149. See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at
175).
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must be objectively reasonable.150
Probable cause to arrest has been said to be present when there is
substantial evidence that a crime has been committed and that the person
to be arrested committed it 151 or, when “the facts and circumstances
within [the arresting officer’s] knowledge and of which he had
reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that” the person to be arrested had
committed or was committing an offense. 152 Probable cause to search
has been said to be present when “the known facts and circumstances are
sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found” in the place to be
searched. 153
Efforts to define probable cause in terms of the intensity of
someone’s belief in another’s guilt necessarily result in vague
definitions. Moreover, the difficulties inherent in communicating
intelligently a sound method of analyzing the intensity of one’s belief 154
make it difficult to apply any definitions to specific factual situations. 155
150. Devenbeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152-53 (2004); Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371; see also
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (reasonableness cannot depend on the subjective
motivation of the police officer).
151. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370 (noting that there was no question that a felony had been
committed and observing that the only question was whether the arresting “officer had probable
cause to believe that Pringle committed that crime.”); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a) (“If the
complaint or one or more affidavits filed with the complaint establish probable cause to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the judge must issue an arrest
warrant.”).
152. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 369 (2009) (quoting
Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175); Adams, 407 U.S. at 148 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964));
see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (referring to the quantum of evidence
which would constitute probable cause as the amount which would generate this belief).
153. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996); see also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547, 556 & n.6 (1978) (“Two conclusions necessary to the issuance of the warrant must be
supported by substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being
connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched.”)
(citing authorities).
154. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369 (1970) (Harlan J. concurring) (quoting 9 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 325 (3d. ed. 1940).
155. Courts have often observed that attempts to explain the term “reasonable doubt” are
usually unhelpful for this same reason. See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140
(1954); United States v. Hanson, 994 F.2d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The trial court should not
attempt to define reasonable doubt because ‘[a]n attempt to define reasonable doubt presents a risk
without any real benefit.’”) (quoting United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1988));
see also United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 1985) (recognizing that “little can be
gained from attempts to define reasonable doubt” and admonishing district courts not to do so, but
holding that “doing so does not require reversal”); cf. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 18 (1994)
(allowing definition of reasonable doubt as “such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and prudent
person, in one of the graver and more important transactions of life, to pause and hesitate before . . .
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If probable cause is a single standard defined solely in terms of the
mental state of an objectively reasonable person who is attempting to
determine whether it is present, the seriousness of the offense under
investigation will ordinarily be of little relevance to the probable cause
determination. Occasionally, the nature of the offense could affect the
way an observer perceives and interprets available information. More
often, the seriousness of a suspected offense may be relevant to the
intensity of an official’s desire to act. These factors, however, impact
differently on different people and should be of little relevance in
determining how an objectively reasonable person would feel or act.
b. Probable Cause as a Probability
The Supreme Court has often said that “[t]he probable-cause
standard . . . deals with probabilities.” 156 Probable cause has been said
to “require . . . only a probability or substantial chance of criminal
activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”157 It does not mean a
prima facie case,158 it “means less than evidence which would justify . . .
conviction, [but] more than bare suspicion,” 159 or reasonable
acting”); United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 30 (1st Cir. 2006) (approving trial judge’s
statement that reasonable doubt “does not mean . . . beyond all doubt or beyond any conceivable
shadow of a doubt.”); Federal Judicial Center Committee to Study Criminal Jury Instructions,
Pattern Juror Instructions, Instr. 21 (Federal Judicial Center 2008); Henry A. Diamond, Reasonable
Doubt: To Define to Not to Define, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1716, 1723 (1990) (the words “reasonable
doubt” confuse jurors).
156. See, e.g., Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371; see also Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 (“in dealing with
probable cause . . . we deal with probabilities.”). On the use of mathematics and probability theory
in criminal trials, see generally Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics, Precision and Ritual in
the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
157. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 n.13 (1983); see also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1,
557 U.S. at 371 (“fair probability” or “substantial chance”).
158. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (“only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal
activity is the standard of probable cause.”) (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419
(1969)); Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (expressly rejecting the
argument that probable cause means prima facie evidence); United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d
341, 346 (2d Cir. 1983) (probable cause requires “only a probability and not a prima facie showing
of criminal activity”); Commonwealth v. Jones, 484 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Pa. 1984) (“probable cause
[to issue a search warrant] is based on a finding of the probability, not a prima facie showing of
criminal activity”); State v. Bates, 495 A.2d 422, 425 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (“probable
cause need not equal the prima facie case required to sustain a conviction.”).
159. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175; see also Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir.
1985) (“Probable cause means . . . more than bare suspicion, but less than virtual certainty [and] . . .
describes not a point but a zone within which the graver the crime the more latitude the police must
be allowed.”); cf. Locke, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 348 (probable cause “means less than evidence
which would justify condemnation” and “imports a seizure made under circumstances which
warrant suspicion”); Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply To The Critics
of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 465, 478-95 (1984) (tracing the history of probable
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suspicion. 160 However, probable cause does not appear to refer to any
particular level of probability.
Despite occasional suggestions that probable cause is synonymous
with a more likely than not level of certainty, 161 the vast majority of
authorities describe probable cause 162 in general terms. Thus, in Texas v.
cause and suggesting that the early English common law equated probable cause with little more
than suspicion, while the First Congress, which proposed the Bill of Rights, viewed probable cause
as the equivalent of a “focused suspicion”).
160. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 n.4 (1987) (outside the administrative law
context, “probable cause” refers to “a quantum of evidence for the belief justifying the search, to be
distinguished from a lesser quantum such as ‘reasonable suspicion’”). In Dumbra v. United States,
268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925), the Court held that issuance of a search warrant requires “reasonable
grounds . . . for the belief that the law was being violated on the premises to be searched” and
quoted with approval from Stacey v. Emory, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878), where the Court characterized
probable cause as “a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the party is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.” This definition is still in use in some settings in some states. See, e.g.,
Redican v. K Mart Corp., 734 S.W. 2d 864, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (suit for malicious
prosecution) (quoting Palermo v. Cottom, 525 S.W.2d 758, 764 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)). The Stacey
Court also said probable cause is “such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary caution to
believe, or to entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the person is guilty.” Stacey, 97 U.S. at
645.
161. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 562 A.2d 1057, 1059 n.2 (Vt. 1999) (“more likely than not” is
the test, “where the pertinent inquiry is whether evidence of a crime will be found in particular
place”); State v. Johnson, 422 So. 2d 1125, 1127 (La. 1982) (Probable cause for an arrest exists
when it is “more probable than not that the defendant’s activity consisted of criminal behavior” and
holding that an officer who saw defendant leave a narcotics outlet, remove a gun from his waist
band, and throw it on front seat of car had “reasonable cause to believe that it was more probable
than not” the defendant “had been carrying the weapon concealed on his person”); People v. Triggs,
506 P.2d 232 (Cal. 1973) (en banc) (events equally consistent with innocence or with criminal
activity “cannot afford the police probable cause to search.”); People v. Rosales, 237 Cal. Rptr. 558,
561 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (“more evidence for than against”); Steven Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95
YALE L. J. 1405, 1418 n.100 (1986); William Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L. J.
365, 390-94 (1981) (suggesting an economic efficiency theory that defines probable cause as more
likely than not); Kathryn A. Buckner, Note, School Drug Tests: A Fourth Amendment Perspective,
1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 284 (1987) (stating, without citing any decisions, that “[m]ost of the
Court’s early opinions have adopted a ‘more probable than not’ test.”).
The more likely than not formula has also been invoked in probable cause determinations made in
preliminary hearings. See, e.g., State v. Sheppard, 581 P.2d 549, 551 (Or. Ct. App. 1978). Without
analyzing the question, the Supreme Court has said that “preponderance of the evidence” is
synonymous with “more likely than not.” Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
The Supreme Court has said that the kind of reasonable suspicion that will justify a Terry stop “is
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence . . . [and] is
obviously less demanding than that [required] for probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
162. Occasionally, it is claimed that the use of the word “probable” is evidence that “more
likely than not” is the proper level of certainty. See, e.g., Duke, supra note 161, at 1418 n.100;
State v. Jones, 417 So. 2d 788, 793 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Cowart, J., concurring) (probable
means “more likely than not”). However, standard dictionary definitions of “probable” usually
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Brown, 163 a plurality of the Supreme Court expressly stated that probable
cause does not mean more likely than not.164 Rather, said the Brown
plurality, a “practical, non-technical’ probability . . . is all that is
required.” 165 That same year, in Illinois v. Gates, 166 the Supreme Court
said that probable cause to search exists when a magistrate finds, based
on “the totality-of-the-circumstances,” that “there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.” 167
Probable cause is “a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” 168 Thus, “[f]inely tuned standards
such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the
evidence . . . have no place in the [probable cause] decision [and] . . . an
effort to fix some general, numerically precise degree of certainty

make no reference to “more likely than not” and define “probable” as “likely” or based on adequate
or fairly convincing, but not conclusive, evidence. See, e.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002). Even before Gates, some courts had expressly held that the
Fourth Amendment’s use of the word “probable” in the phrase “probable cause” does not indicate
that probable cause means “more likely than not” or “by a preponderance of the evidence.” See,
e.g., United States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492, 495 (1st Cir. 1979).
In formulating its Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, the American Law Institute rejected
the use of the term “probable cause” because it suggests that an arrest or search can only be made if
guilt appears more probable than not. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE A MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, 292-296, § 120 commentary (1975).
163. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
164. Id. at 742. Other courts have also rejected the more likely than not test. See, e.g., United
States v. Antone, 753 F.2d 1301, 1304 (5th Cir. 1985) (The probable cause requirement does “not
demand any showing that such a belief [that a crime is occurring] be correct or more likely true than
false.”) (quoting Brown, 460 U.S. at 742); United States v. Hendershot, 614 F.2d 648, 654 (2d Cir.
1980) (stating that the “the more likely than not” standard is “improper”); People v. Hearty, 644
P.2d 302, 310 (Colo. 1982) (expressly rejecting the more probable than not standard); Darden v.
State, 571 So.2d 1272, 1279 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (“[N]either certainty nor a 50% plus
probability is demanded by the concept of probable cause”) (quoting Mewbourn v. State, 570 So.2d
805 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)”); see also Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 438 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating, in the context of a civil suit based on a lack of probable cause to arrest, that probable cause
“is less than a rule of more-likely-than- not, but how much less depends on the circumstances.”); cf.
2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 3.2(e), at 69 (suggesting that “the question of
whether probable cause to arrest means more-probable-than not . . . is still open.”).
165. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
166. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
167. Id. at 238; see also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371
(2009) (“fair probability” or “substantial chance”).
168. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232); see
also Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732 (1984) (observing that in Gates “[w]e did not
merely refine or qualify the ‘two-pronged test.’ We rejected it as hypertechnical and divorced
from” reality and substituted the totality of the circumstances approach.).
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corresponding to ‘probable cause’ may not be helpful.” 169 In Maryland
v. Pringle, 170 the Court made this point again, saying that probable cause
is “incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages
because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the
circumstances.” 171
Brown, Gates, and Pringle should have sounded the death knell of
the more likely than not test. Nonetheless, that standard will, in some
cases, be a useful starting point for analysis. By itself, however, it is
unlikely to lead to the resolution of individual cases. Even in the context
of probable cause to arrest, which entails merely determining the
likelihood that a particular individual committed an offense,172 few cases
can be easily reduced to the level of simplicity required by a more likely
than not test. 173 For example, if a police officer saw an individual
carrying a cup and the only question was whether that individual was in
violation of some ordinance barring the carrying of open container of
alcohol, a more likely than not test might be a useful aid in analyzing the
169. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235; see also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 557 U.S. at 379.
170. 540 U.S. 366 (1970).
171. Id. at 371. See also People v. Rosales, 237 Cal. Rptr. 558, 561 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (the
probable cause standard “cannot be applied with mathematical precision, or according to a set
formula”). Most commentators seem to agree that properly interpreted the case law does not fix a
precise, inflexible, standard of probable cause. See, e.g., Donald Dripps, More on Search Warrants,
Good Faith, and Probable Cause, 95 YALE L. J. 1424, 1429 (1986) (“Current law describes the
substantive standard as ‘more probable than not’ under some circumstances and as ‘somewhat less
than more probable than not’ under other circumstances.”).
172. Professor LaFave has said that the Supreme Court’s decisions suggest that probable cause
to arrest does not exist “unless the information at hand singles out one individual.” 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 3.2(e) at 68; see also Grano, supra note 159, at 499
(observing that the common law of arrest did not require much suspicion, but did require that some
degree of suspicion be focused on a specific individual); cf. People v. Masters, 508 N.E.2d 1163,
1169 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (warrantless entry into room upheld where probable cause existed that
some occupant was committing an offense because there was LSD in the apartment). Neil
Ackerman, Comment, Considering the Two-Tier Model of the Fourth Amendment, 31 AM. U. L.
REV. 85, 107-09 (1981).
173. A more likely than not test would render unconstitutional those arrests for investigation
that are made on the basis of less than probable cause. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra
note 57, § 3.2 at 71-76 (noting investigative function of arrests and saying that such arrests can be
made on the basis of less evidence than ordinary arrests); People v. Lee, 502 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986) (“since arrests may serve an investigative purpose, they are not limited to situations
where the facts indicate that it is more probable than not that the suspect has committed the crime”);
see also State v. Gant, 490 S.W.2d 46, 47-48 (Mo. 1973) (suggesting that it was proper to pick up
robbery suspect for further investigation in order to put him in lineup and to determine if the only
living victim of robbery-murder could identify him even though probable cause was lacking).
However, many cases have said that even arrests for investigation or questioning must be based on
probable cause. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979); People v. McBride,
510 N.E.2d 1087, 1089 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that the arrest of the defendant “for
investigation” was illegal because it was without probable cause).
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known facts. 174 Even under those circumstances, however, it is difficult
to quantify one’s suspicions with any meaningful degree of precision.
Most cases are far more complex. 175 For example, in Pringle, the
defendant was one of three occupants in a vehicle. The police searched
it and found $763 and five plastic glassine baggies containing cocaine.
They arrested all three men, and Pringle challenged his arrest as being
without probable cause.
When Pringle was arrested there were three possibilities. The first
was that the cocaine was the sole property of one of the three occupants.
If this were the case there was, in the abstract, only a 33.3% chance that
the sole possessor was Pringle. Other facts, of course, could have raised

174. Most courts faced with the question have held that arresting officers need only have
probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed some crime and need not
know, or be able to articulate, in advance the precise crime for which the arrest will be or is being
made. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-54 (2004); see also Hatcher v. State, 410
N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (Ind. 1980) (search incident to arrest valid where police officer had probable
cause to arrest defendant for armed robbery but instead arrested him for disorderly conduct—for
which she had no probable cause); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 162, at 13, § 120.1(2)
(“An arrest shall not be deemed to have been made on insufficient cause hereunder solely on the
ground that the officer is unable to determine the particular crime which may have been
committed.”).
There is no requirement that the offense establishing probable cause be “closely related to,
and based on the same conduct as, the offense identified by the arresting officer at the time of
arrest.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153; cf. Walker v. City of Mobile, 508 So. 2d 1209, 1214 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1987) (“A statement of the cause of the arrest is always mandatory except when the
person is arrested in the commission of the act.”), cert. denied, 508 So. 2d 1209 (Ala. 1987).
175. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 421 S.E.2d 227 (W.Va. 1992) (where murder was committed
by one person but evidence pointed to two men and it was highly probable that one or the other had
committed the crime, there was probable cause to search as to each one separately). The difficulty
of applying the more likely than not test in arrest cases is increased by the fact that in most such
cases there is not one probability but at least two. First, a court must determine the likelihood that
an offense was committed, and second, it must determine the likelihood that a particular offender
committed it. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a) (an arrest warrant shall issue if “there is probable
cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it”); State
v. Bates, 495 A.2d 422, 425 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (observing that probable cause to
arrest demands “a well-grounded suspicion or belief that (1) an offense is taking place or has taken
place and (2) that the suspected individual is or was a party to it.”). Even a seventy percent
probability for each of these two primary factors—a relatively high level of certainty—translates
into only a forty-nine percent overall probability. Of course, greater certainty as to one prong might
offset or compensate for lesser certainty as to the other prong. Cf. People v. Wright, 490 N.E.2d
640, 646 (Ill. 1985) (stating that “where there is uncertainty as to whether a crime has been
committed, the privacy rights may be given more consideration” and observing that in the case
before it there was “no doubt that a crime had been committed”).
Each of the two primary probabilities in arrest cases is often itself a function of various underlying
probabilities. On occasion the various probabilities will be wholly independent of one another;
more often, they will be, to a greater or lesser extent, interdependent. See State v. Jones, 417 So. 2d
788, 792-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Cowart J., dissenting).
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or lowered this probability. 176 There were two other possibilities: either
the cocaine was the joint property of two of the occupants, or it was the
joint property of all three occupants. Without deciding whether a 33.3%
chance standing alone was sufficient to establish probable cause, the
Court held, in effect, that all three possibilities taken together were
sufficient to establish “probable cause to believe Pringle committed the
crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly.” 177
Probable cause to search is an inquiry different from and, more
complex than, probable cause to arrest. 178 Determining the existence of
probable cause to search entails weighing and evaluating considerations
of time, place, the objects sought, the crime being investigated, and other
factors, in order to decide whether there is a sufficient likelihood that
specific permissible objects of a search can presently be found in a given
place. 179 Given the number of variables involved, quantifying the
176. Courts often solve probability problems by per se rules. Thus, reports are generally
assumed to be reliable if they come from witnesses, victims of crime, law enforcement officials, or
citizen informants, not part of the criminal milieu. See e.g., United States v. LaFond, 482 F. Supp.
1379, 1384 (E.D. Wisc. 1980) (citing cases); Bush v. State, 523 So. 2d 538, 544-45 (Ala. Crim.
App.), cert denied, 523 So. 2d 538 (Ala. 1988) (“[A]ny person purporting to be a crime victim or
witness may be presumed reliable”); Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 202 (Del. 1986). It is only
professional or anonymous informers or persons involved in or connected with crime whose reports
require corroboration. See, e.g., LaFond, 482 F. Supp. at 1384 (citing cases); Bush, 523 So. 2d at
544-45.
177. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372 (2003).
178. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 & n.6 (1978) (“It does not follow,
however, that probable cause for arrest would justify the issuance of a search warrant, or, on the
other hand, that probable cause for a search warrant would necessarily justify an arrest. Each
requires probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances—a point which is seldom
made explicit in the appellate cases.”) (citations omitted); State v. Heinz, 480 A.2d 452, 460 (Conn.
1984) (“The probable cause determination in the context of arrest warrants requires inquiries that
are less complex constitutionally than those that pertain to search warrants.”); see also 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 3.2. at 71 (probable cause to search, in contrast to probable
cause to arrest, requires a probability determination with respect to certain specified items being in a
particular place).
179. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, §3.2(e) at 81, 5 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 10.1(b) at 9 (probable cause to search exists when there is substantial
evidence that the items sought are, in fact, seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal
activity and there is a fair probability that the items will be found in the place to be searched); U.S
v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006) (in the typical search case, the “determination that there is
probable cause for the search amounts to a prediction that the item will still be there when the
warrant is executed”); Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 556 & n.6 (1978) (“Search warrants may be issued
only . . . upon a showing of probable cause—that is, reasonable grounds to believe—that criminally
related objects are in the place which the warrant authorizes to be searched, at the time when the
search is authorized to be conducted.”); People v. Lyons, 872 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)
(“‘To determine probable cause, a sufficient nexus between a criminal offense, the items to be
seized, and the place to be searched must be established. . . . When there is no direct information to
establish a nexus, reasonable inferences may be entertained to create the nexus’” (citing People v.
Beck, 713 N.E.2d. 596, 601 (1999))).
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likelihood that a given search will be successful is usually an all but
impossible task. 180 Perhaps as a reflection of this fact, references to a
more likely than not test are less frequent in the search context 181 than in
the arrest context.182
In Dunaway v. New York, 183 the Court rejected the use of “a
multifactor balancing test” that might cause the existing bright-line test
of probable cause to disappear as courts consider and balance “the
multifarious circumstances presented by different cases.”184 Dunaway

The length of time that has passed from when evidence of a crime was observed to when
the complaint is issued is highly relevant to whether probable cause exists. United States v.
Wagner, 989 F. 2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1993). Probable cause ceases to exist when the information
relied on to prove its existence has grown stale. See, e.g., People v. Rehkopf, 506 N.E.2d 435, 43738 (Ill. App. Ct.. 1987) (thirteen months was too long, but the evidence was admissible because it
was obtained in good faith reliance on a warrant).
The Constitution requires specificity in warrants. See Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 97 (observing
that only two things must be particularly described; “‘the place to be searched’ and ‘the persons or
things to be seized’”).
180. It has been observed that even in the absence of any particular reason to suspect anything,
there is probably a substantial probability that evidence of some crime can be found if any particular
place is thoroughly searched at any particular time. See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and
the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 255-56 (1984). However, it has also been pointed
out that law enforcement activities directed against persons to whom no specific suspicions have
attached run afoul of “the fourth amendment’s concern.” Grano, supra note 159, at 498.
181. See, e.g., United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 346 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Plainly, the
standard of probable cause cannot imply ‘more probable than not’ under circumstances such as
those here where many locations were available to the guilty parties to secrete the stolen goods.”);
United States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492, 495 (1st Cir. 1979) (rejecting claim that probable cause to
search means “more likely than not,” or “by a preponderance of the evidence” and suggesting that
probable cause is synonymous with reasonable grounds to believe) (Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 556 n.6
(1978)).
In practice, the percentage of searches pursuant to warrants that are successful (in the
sense that the searching officers find incriminating items of the kind named in the warrant) appears
to be much higher than fifty percent. See, e.g., Edward Ray, Statistical Analysis of Search Warrants
and Their Evidentiary Basis (May 26, 1997) (studying warrants issued in three Southern Illinois
counties (Bond, Jackson, and Madison), in 1989, 1990, 1991, 1995, and 1996 and finding a success
rate of a little over 90%) (unpublished student seminar paper) (on file with the author); Robert
Barker, Statistical Analysis of Search Warrants (Oct. 19, 2003) (studying warrants issued in two
Southeast Missouri Counties (Mississippi and Cape Girardeau in 2000 and 2001) and finding a
success rate of about 96%) (unpublished student seminar paper) (on file with the author); Bill
Vandersand, Research on Search Warrants (Oct. 28, 2003) (studying 119 search warrants issued
from 1994-2003 by six federal magistrates in the Western District of Kentucky, Eastern District of
Missouri, and Southern District of Illinois, and finding that 112 were actually executed and ninety
(80.4% of those executed) yielded positive results) (unpublished student paper) (on file with the
author).
182. See, e.g., People v. Carrasquillo, 429 N.E.2d 775, 778 (N.Y. 1981) (probable cause to
arrest requires that it “appear to be at least more probable than not that a crime has taken place and
that the one arrested is its perpetrator”).
183. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
184. Id. at 213-214.
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did not hold that only one standard should govern all Fourth Amendment
activities. In fact, the Dunaway Court reaffirmed the propriety of the
reasonable-suspicion standard in certain settings. 185
Defining probable cause in terms of a single constant level of
probability has the superficial appeal of appearing to simplify the
probable cause determination. 186 However, there is no inherent reason
that the degree of certainty required before a particular Fourth
Amendment activity may be undertaken could not vary depending on the
seriousness of the offense toward which the activity is directed. 187 In
theory, searches and seizures directed toward or precipitated by
extremely serious offenses (apocalyptic offenses) 188 could be permitted
on the basis of lesser degrees of certainty than searches and seizures
directed at or precipitated by ordinary offenses. 189 Conversely, searches
and seizures directed at very minor offenses, especially those that
185. Id. at 209-211.
186. Professor Alschuler illustrates the problems with a constant level of probability with the
example of a reliable informant who has provided information that a bomb is set to explode in a
rented locker in a New York airport. However, the informant does not know in which of 150
lockers the bomb is located. Given the magnitude of the danger and the relatively impersonal
intrusions, it can reasonably be argued that the police should have the right to search all the lockers
despite the fact that there is less than a one percent chance the bomb will be in any particular locker.
Alschuler, supra note 180, at 246-47. See also Dripps, supra note 171, at 1430 (citing an example
where the police can prove with certainty that a particular individual is dealing drugs from a
particular location, but are not certain which drugs and arguing that in these circumstances a search
would pose no threat to legitimate privacy rights, but would advance law enforcement interests).
Of course, even in the case of lockers, where the expectation of privacy is less, there could
presumably be some stopping point where, for example, hundreds of lockers in several airports were
involved.
187. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 784
(1994) (It makes “little sense to insist on the same amount of probability regardless of the
imminence of the harm, the intrusiveness of the search, the reason for the search, and so on”);
Alschuler, supra note 180, at 245-49 (arguing that “[t]he concept of probable cause can be
interpreted sensibly only as an embodiment of the ‘multifactor balancing test that the Court rejected
in Dunaway” and observing that “[a] unitary view of the probable cause requirement leads . . . to
incongruous results.”); Barrett, supra note 139, at 63.
188. See Schroeder, The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 439, 546-52
(1990) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin].
189. See, e.g., Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985) (Even where a
“multiple murderer is on the loose . . . there must be reasonable grounds for believing that the search
of this house would prove fruitful”; the existence of an emergency “great but not apocalyptic in its
menace . . . does not give the police a license to search and seize without a reasonable basis . . .”);
United States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 1973) (“The threshold of probable cause was
lowered by” the fact that the search in question “took place at the time of and within a few blocks of
a racial disturbance.”); cf. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1979) (rejecting argument that the
Terry reasonable belief standard should be applied to searches of persons who appear to be involved
in narcotics trafficking); Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (noting that the
“public interest would hardly justify a sweeping search of an entire city conducted in the hope that
[stolen] . . . goods might be found.”).
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involve invading the home, could be barred altogether 190 or permitted
only where there is a high probability that the search will be successful.
Similarly, arrests of persons suspected of apocalyptic offenses could be
permitted on the basis of reasonable suspicion while arrests of minor
offenders could be barred altogether or permitted only where there is a
high probability that the arrestee is guilty. 191
c. Probable Cause as the Accommodation of Competing
Interests
The Court has often said that the balancing of competing interests is
the key principle of the Fourth Amendment. 192 Probable cause has been
said to be “‘the best compromise that has been found for accommodating
[the] often opposing interests’ in ‘safeguard[ing] citizens from rash and
unreasonable interferences with privacy’ and ‘in seek[ing] to give fair
leeway for enforcing the law.” 193
Many public and private interests are accommodated within the
compromise represented by the Fourth Amendment. At any given time
and place, the privacy interest—as defined by the character of the place
to be searched, 194 by reasonable expectations of privacy and by

190. See William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842 (2001) (house searches, even with probable cause and a
warrant, should perhaps be barred for anything associated with marijuana); cf. State v. Weist, 730
P.2d 26, 28-29 (Or. 1986) (rejecting argument that legislature “could not constitutionally authorize
the use of search warrants in the investigation of violations, infractions, or other non-criminal
offenses”).
191. See, e.g., BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 127-28 (7th Cir. 1986) (no probable cause
where the crime, child neglect, was serious but there was no danger of its imminent repetition); see
also Moore v. The Marketplace Rest., 754 F.2d 1336, 1345 (7th Cir. 1985) (jury question whether
there was probable cause to arrest restaurant patrons who had not paid their bill but had not fled,
were not dangerous, and whose crime was not serious); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 393-95 (10th
Cir. 1984) (holding unreasonable strip search of person detained for traffic offense); Mary Beth G.
v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding unreasonable strip searches of
persons briefly detained after their arrests for nondangerous misdemeanors).
192. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 700, n.12 (1981)).
193. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (quoting Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)); see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Gerald G. Ashdown, The
Fourth Amendment and the Legitimate Expectation of Privacy, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289 (1981).
194. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (noting that “physical entry of
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed”)
(quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)); Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (searches of automobiles are “far less intrusive on the rights
protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one’s person or a building”); See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967) (“We do not in any way imply that business premises may not
reasonably be inspected in many more situations than private homes”). See also California v.
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constitutionally protected areas—remains relatively constant. The
impact of the government’s activities, however, varies widely. A search
will often be less intrusive than a custodial arrest.195 A search
undertaken through the use of high technology will obviously be more
invasive than a traditional search. The nature of the things sought, 196 the
magnitude of the intrusion, 197 whether a warrant was obtained, 198 the
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 395 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The character of ‘the place to be searched’
plays an important role in Fourth Amendment analysis”) (quoting U.S. Const., Amend. IV).
Compare Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-90 (1980) (holding that ordinarily warrantless
felony arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment) with United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976) (permitting warrantless felony arrests in a public place).
195. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (“A search may cause only
annoyance and temporary inconvenience to the law-abiding citizen. . . . An arrest, however, is a
serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the person seized is guilty or innocent.”); cf. State
v. Heinz, 480 A.2d 452, 460 (Conn. 1984) (“As we have noted previously, because arrests are
inherently less apt to be intrusive than are searches, there is a difference in the constitutional
standards by which probable cause to arrest and probable cause to search are measured.”).
Because a search is often less intrusive than a custodial arrest, it could be argued that an
entry to search should be permissible in some situations where an entry to arrest would not be
permissible. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 776 (1969) (White, J., dissenting). In his
dissent, Justice White stated:
[I]f circumstances can justify the warrantless arrest, it would be strange to say that the
Fourth Amendment bars the warrantless search, regardless of the circumstances, since
the invasion and disruption of a man’s life and privacy which stem from his arrest are
ordinarily far greater than the relatively minor intrusions attending a search of his
premises.
196. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 309, 321-22 (1972)
(implicitly acknowledging that the nature of some kinds of crime renders those crimes subject to
different kinds of treatment for Fourth Amendment purposes); cf. New York v. P.J. Video Inc., 475
U.S. 868, 873-75 & n.6 (1986) (reaffirming earlier cases holding that “special conditions” must be
met before books and films may be seized but holding that “an application for a warrant to search
for materials presumptively protected by the First Amendment should be evaluated under the same
standard of probable cause used to review warrant applications generally,” and rejecting the
argument that a “‘higher’ standard of probable cause” should apply to warrants directed at such
materials) (citing Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 502-04 (1973), and Stanford v. Texas, 379
U.S. 476, 485-86 (1965)).
At one time, no search was permitted for items of “evidential value only.” See Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1921). This rule was rejected in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 309-10 (1967), although the argument is occasionally made that certain types of evidence—in
particular private papers—are beyond the reach of a constitutionally reasonable search or seizure.
See Warden, 387 U.S. at 323-25 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See generally Eric Schnapper,
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869 (1985) and cases cited therein;
Craig M. Bradley, Constitutional Protection for Private Papers, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 461
(1981).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882-83 (7th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that a
highly intrusive technique such as television surveillance of a home could properly be barred in
connection with minor crimes); see also Wayne R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the
Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 55 n.82 (1968) [hereinafter
“Street Encounters”] (“a higher standard of probable cause than ordinarily required would be called
for when the intrusion is particularly severe.”); Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court,
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reliability of the information on which probable cause is based,199 and
other factors may also be relevant. 200 Finally, while most Fourth
Amendment activities are motivated by the goal of “effective crime
prevention and detection,” 201 all are not motivated by a single objective
of constant weight. “There is one . . . variable—the seriousness of the
offense—which cannot be ignored by police and courts.” 202 The simple,
undeniable fact is that society has a greater interest in apprehending a
multiple murderer than in apprehending a person with a single ounce of
marijuana in her possession or a teenager drinking a beer.203
Some cases suggest that a single standard of probable cause applies
to all situations without the need to “balance the interests and
circumstances involved in particular situations.”204 However, the
government’s interest in enforcing the law and in apprehending
28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 687 (1961) (same).
198. It has been sometimes said that the preference to be accorded warrants is an important
consideration in determining the existence of probable cause in doubtful or marginal cases. See
Watson, 423 U.S. at 423 (“judgments about probable cause may be more readily accepted where
backed by a warrant issued by a magistrate”).
199. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 379 (2009) (looking to the
degree to which the information implies prohibited conduct, its specificity, and its reliability); see
also United States v. Maestas, 546 F.2d 1177, 1180 (5th Cir. 1977) (observing that first-hand
evidence that seizable materials are on the premises sought to be searched is not necessary and
stating that evidence that a defendant has stolen material which would “normally” be hidden at his
residence is sufficient to support a search of that residence) (citing United States v. Lucarz, 430 F.2d
1051 (9th Cir. 1970)).
200. See United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 852
(1985) (other factors include the extent of any opportunity to conceal evidence and the normal
inferences that can be drawn about likely hiding places); see also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419,
427 (2004) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) in which the Court stated in that in
judging the reasonableness of a seizure: “we look to the ‘gravity of the public concerns served by
the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the
interference with the individual liberty’”); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978)
(“[A] less stringent standard of probable cause is acceptable where the entry is not to secure
evidence of crime against the possessor.”).
201. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). Some Fourth Amendment activities are motivated
by the need to aid persons, or to protect property. See, e.g., Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S.
398 (2006) (officers observed ongoing physical altercation between occupants from outside home);
see also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009) (per curiam) (officers arrived at house in response
to a complain and “noticed blood on the hood of the pickup [in the driveway] and on clothes inside
of it, as well as on one of the doors to the house. . . . Through a window, the officers could see . . .
Fisher, inside the house, screaming and throwing things.”)
202. “Street Encounters,” supra note 197, at 57.
203. See, e.g., Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565-66 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The shooting of
seven persons (four fatally) by a team of criminals in the space of two hours is about as grave a
crisis as a local police department will encounter. The police must be allowed more leeway in
resolving it than when they are investigating the theft of a bicycle.”).
204. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979); see also Ybarra v. Illinois,
444 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1979) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
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offenders is greater if the offense is more serious or if the offender is a
greater threat to the public205 and less if the offense is not serious or if
the offender is not a threat.
If probable cause represents an
accommodation of competing interests, it follows that it should be, to
some extent, a function of the seriousness of the offense to which that
cause relates. 206
Some offenses are so minor that the state’s interest in making
arrests for those offenses should not justify warrantless home entries,
even with a warrant, in order to do so. 207 Similarly, the balance of
interests that underlies the probable cause determination could warrant
the conclusion that there can never be probable cause, no matter how
great the likelihood of success, to justify the use of high technology or
an entry into a home to search for evidence of minor crimes. 208
At the other end of the scale, it could be argued that some offenses
are so serious (or even apocalyptic) that the balance of interests justifies
home entries directed at locating evidence of such crimes even when
there is a relatively low likelihood of success. Certainly, it is not
unreasonable to suggest that the great public interest in taking action to
prevent (and sometimes to apprehend the perpetrators of) these kinds of
offenses should affect the way courts assess the balance of interests in
such cases. 209
d. Probable Cause and the Totality of the Circumstances
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the common sense
nature of probable cause and has said that the existence of probable
cause turns on the “totality-of-the-circumstances.” 210 This approach, it
205. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 3.2 at 31-36.
206. See Llaguno, 763 F.2d at 1566 (“[T]he amount of probable cause they will have, is a
function of the gravity of the crime, and especially the danger of its imminent repetition.”); cf. 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 3.2 at 33 (stating that perhaps this “is the correct
conclusion”).
207. See Stuntz, supra note 190 (house searches, even with probable cause and a warrant,
should perhaps be barred for anything associated with marijuana); cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740 (1984) (barring most home entries to arrest for non-jailable offenses but implicitly allowing
such entries with a warrant).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882-86 (7th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that
the use of highly intrusive techniques such as television surveillance should be barred where minor
offenses are concerned); Stuntz, supra note 190.
209. See, e.g., Llaguno, 763 F.2d at 1565-66 (“An emergency, . . . great but not apocalyptic in
its menace, . . . would not allow the police to search every house in Chicago or even every house on
the Llagunos’ block,” but “the fact that a multiple murderer is on the loose . . . may affect the
judgment of what is reasonable”).
210. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-32, 238, 241 (1983) (“The task of the
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was said in Illinois v. Gates, best “achieve[s] the accommodation of
public and private interests that the fourth amendment requires.”211 In
Tennessee v. Garner, 212 the Court cited a number of cases, in both search
and seizure contexts, which it viewed as reflecting the totality of the
circumstances approach to determining the reasonableness of a given
search or seizure. 213
Relevant circumstances have been said to include, inter alia, the
intensity of the actor’s belief in the likely success of his actions, the
probability of success, and the competing interests of the individual and
the government. 214 There is no inherent reason that the seriousness of
the offense under investigation could not also be added to the
equation. 215 In fact, the common sense nature of the totality of the
circumstances approach almost compels courts to look at the seriousness
of the offense. 216
Occasional decisions have specifically said that the fact that a
person being arrested was believed to have committed a felony or other
serious or violent offense is a relevant factor in determining whether the
officers acted properly. 217 Others have specifically considered the
seriousness of the offense and “the danger of its imminent repetition” as
relevant factors in the probable cause equation.218 Thus, in Llaguno v.
issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given [the totality
of] all the circumstances . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of crime will be
found in a particular place.”); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (“probable cause
is a flexible, common- sense standard”); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)
(“probable cause is a practical, non-technical conception”).
211. 462 U.S. at 230, 238-39.
212. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
213. Id. at 8-9.
214. See supra notes 196-203 (citing authorities). When Atwater was decided by the Fifth
Circuit, Judge Weiner, writing in dissent, criticized the majority’s analysis because it “focuses
solely on the quantum of certainty involved in the case, to the exclusion of the other two relevant
variables: the importance of the government’s interest and the extent of the intrusion on the
individual’s liberty and privacy interests.” Atwater v. Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 249 (5th Cir.
1999) (en banc) (Weiner J., dissenting).
215. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 3.2(a) at 33 (“It is tempting to
conclude that the seriousness of the offense should be a factor in the probable cause equation.”).
216. See Jeffrey Bellin, Crime Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing
Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9 (2011) (noting “the close relationship
between reasonableness, the public interest, and crime severity . . . in the common-sense judgments
of ‘our daily lives,’ popular-opinion surveys, pronouncements of political actors, . . . scholarly
commentary, and even judicial opinions.”).
217. See e.g., Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1566 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing cases); People
v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140 (1972) (“The crime was one of enormous gravity, and ‘the gravity of
the offense’ is an appropriate factor to take into consideration.”); see also THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, supra note 162, at 294-96.
218. Llaguno, 763 F.2d at 1566.
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Mingey, 219 the Seventh Circuit dealt with a suit brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 which alleged that members of the Chicago Police Department,
who were searching for two murderers who had shot seven people (four
fatally), acted illegally when they entered and searched the plaintiff’s
(Llaguno’s) home without a search warrant and on the basis of “limited”
information and weak inferences.220 The court held that the phrase
probable cause “describes not a point, but a zone, within which the
graver the crime the more latitude the police must be allowed”221 and
said that the gravity of the crime and the danger of its imminent
repetition will affect the amount of information the police collect and
hence the amount of probable cause they will have.222 Subsequent cases
have said that “[u]nder Seventh Circuit precedent . . . probable cause is a
function of information and exigency,”223 and added that “officers need
a greater quantum of evidence when making arrests for less serious
crimes.” 224
3. The Desirability of Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense
into the Probable Cause Equation
Incorporating the seriousness of the offense into probable cause
equations is a very difficult task. For one thing, courts frequently refer
to probable cause as if it were a single standard applicable
interchangeably to both search and arrest 225 cases. In fact, however, the
probable cause determination in search cases is different from, and more
complex than, that in arrest cases. 226
There is much to be said for factoring the seriousness of the offense
into Fourth Amendment equations where this factor simply tells law
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1564-66.
221. Id. at 1565.
222. Id. at 1566 (“The amount of information that prudent police will collect before deciding
to make a search or an arrest, and hence the amount of probable cause they will have, is a function
of the gravity of the crime, and especially the danger of its imminent repetition.”).
223. BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 1986).
224. Pasiewicz v. Lake County Forest Preserve Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 2001)
(observing that “[w]alking naked in the woods may be only a bit unsettling, but it is considerably
more threatening when coupled with evidence, as in this case, that the walker was watching children
play in a nearby clearing”); see also Moore v. The Marketplace Rest., 754 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir. 1985)
(jury question whether there was probable cause to arrest a patron who had not paid his check
because the crime was minor, the patrons had not fled, and they were not dangerous).
225. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 3.1(b) at 8.
226. State v. Heinz, 480 A.2d 452, 460 (Conn. 1984) (“The probable cause determination in
the context of arrest warrants requires inquiries that are less complex constitutionally than those that
pertain to search warrants.”).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss2/2

38

Schroeder: Factoring the Seriousness
ARTICLE 2 - SCHROEDER (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

FACTORING THE SERIOUSNESS

4/5/2013 6:40 PM

369

enforcement officers that they can act, or, must not act, in a particular
way in a particular setting. A reasonably clear and administrable bright
line between offenses 227 can tell officers when they cannot: (1) make
warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not committed in the arresting
officer’s presence, 228 (2) make warrantless home entries to arrest for
minor offenses, 229 (3) make warrantless home entries to search for
evidence of minor offenses, (4) make Terry stops for past
misdemeanors, 230 (5) make custodial arrests for minor offenses, (6)
make surgical searches or other physical intrusions into the human body,
(7) use deadly force to seize a suspect, 231 or (8) set up roadblocks to find
evidence of, or suspects in, crimes not related to the use of the roads. 232
Because probable cause is a complex, multifactor concept, it does
not lend itself to a rule that makes a single factor—even one as
important as the seriousness of the offense—decisive in determining its
existence. In theory, however, a rule could be formulated that there can
never be probable cause for certain actions directed against those
suspected of minor offenses. 233 For example, a rule could be formulated
that the police can never have probable cause to enter a home to arrest
for, or to seek evidence of, a minor offense. Another possible approach
would be varying standards of probable cause where more intrusive
actions were permitted on the basis of less evidence if the offense was
serious but allowed only upon a heightened standard if the offense was
minor. This approach is not totally inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent. Although the Supreme Court has never demanded an
unusually high level of probable cause for some particular activity, 234 it
has held that lower, or different, levels of probable cause are appropriate

227. See generally Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA.
L. REV. 1957 (2004).
228. See generally William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MO. L. REV. 771 (1993) [hereinafter Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests].
229. See generally Schroeder, The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra note 188.
230. See generally Rachel S. Weiss, Defining the Contours of United Sates v. Hensley:
Limiting the Use of Terry Stops for Completed Misdemeanors, 94 CORNELL L. REV.1321 (2009).
231. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
232. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000).
233. Cf. State v. Weist, 730 P.2d 26, 28-29 (Or. 1986) (rejecting argument that legislature
“could not constitutionally authorize the use of search warrants in the investigation of violations,
infractions, or other non-criminal offenses.”).
234. Cf. New York v. P. J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875 (1986) (rejecting the idea of a
“higher” standard of probable cause for warrants seeking to search books and films and holding that
an application for a warrant authorizing the seizure of “materials presumptively protected by the
First Amendment should be evaluated under the same standard of probable cause used to review
warrant applications generally.”).
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in some administrative search settings. 235 That lower standard, or a
similar one that requires some level of particularized suspicion,236 could
be used for “grave” or “apocalyptic”237 crimes, and a higher one
developed for minor crimes. 238 Such an approach, however, quickly
becomes very complex.
In most Fourth Amendment settings, “the law, . . . including the
definition of probable cause, is more in need of greater clarity than
greater sophistication.” 239 The use of multiple standards is likely to
cause any differences among them to disappear in a sea of ever finer
distinctions. 240 As Professor Amsterdam put it, “[t]he varieties of police
behavior and of the occasions that call it forth are so innumerable that
their reflection in a general sliding scale approach could only produce
more slide than scale . . . [and thereby] convert . . . the fourth
amendment into one immense Rorschach blot.” 241 Some search and
seizure situations recur with sufficient frequency that particular rules
may be useful in their resolution. 242 Moreover, an occasional case might
present facts similar to those presented in a prior case. Generally,
however, “[t]here are so many variables in the probable cause equation
that one determination will seldom be a useful ‘precedent’ for
another.” 243 The more factors that are relevant to the probable cause
235. See 5 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 10.1(b) at 14-16 (discussing
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)).
236. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1967); cf. “Street Encounters,” supra note 197 at 56 &
n.86 (“If the balancing technique is used, it would seem to make no difference in terms of outcome
whether the balancing is done merely to determine what is reasonable or to determine what level of
probable cause is required. . . . [U]nfortunte[ly] . . . the Court did not say . . . this,” but rather stated
that because the situation in Terry did not lend itself to requiring the police to obtain a warrant,
“probable cause is irrelevant.”)
237. See Schroeder, The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra note 188, at 546-552.
238. See Bellin, supra note 216, at 29-33 (proposing three standards, grave, serious, and
minor).
239. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 3.2(a), at 27; see also New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981); Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudication” Versus
“Standardized Procedure” The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141-42; Wayne R.
LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines” and “Good
Faith,” 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 321 (1982); Wayne R. LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the
Supreme Court: Further Ventures Into the “Quagmire,” 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9, 30 (1972).
240. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S 740, 761 (1984) (White, J., dissenting).
241. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
392-93 (1974).
242. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (observing that the ‘“veracity’ and ‘basis
of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information” are relevant considerations); see also
supra note 176 and cases cited therein).
243. Id. at 239 n.11; United States v. Preston, 468 F.2d 1007, 1009 (6th Cir. 1972) (“As is
frequently true in Fourth Amendment cases, we find no directly controlling precedent to guide this
court on this appeal.”); Dripps, supra note 171, at 1430 (stating that the approach proposed by the
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determination, the more fluid the concept of probable cause becomes
and the more difficult it is to apply a given definition of probable cause
to a given situation.
The inclusion of the seriousness of the offense in probable cause
analysis would further complicate an already complex Fourth
Amendment picture without providing meaningful guidance to police
and courts. There is simply no practical way to intelligently assess and
articulate the weight to be assigned to each relevant factor in the
probable cause equation and to quantify the result.244 In most cases,
therefore, the injection of an additional factor into the equation would
have few practical consequences. In a few cases, however, the
seriousness of the offense will be a factor that most observers would say,
as a matter of common sense, should make a difference. In many of
these cases, judges, faced with excluding probative evidence of a serious
offense, are likely, consciously or unconsciously, to distort doctrine to
avoid doing so. 245 As a result, the seriousness of the crime influences
“the probable cause determination even when there is no explicit
acknowledgement of this fact.” 246

author “acknowledges that the variables are so numerous that the cases will not be consistently
decided”).
244. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S 218, 254 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“We
are dealing with factors not easily quantified and, therefore, not easily weighed one against the
other.”); 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 3.2(a) at 24 (noting that probable cause
“remains ‘an exceedingly difficult concept to objectify.’”) (quoting Joseph G. Cook, Probable
Cause to Arrest, 24 VAND. L. REV. 317 (1971)).
245. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 3.2(a) at 33 (referring to “the sub
rosa practice of taking the offense into account”); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 799 (1998) (“Judges do not like excluding bloody knives, so
they distort doctrine, claiming the Fourth Amendment was not really violated”); see also United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925 & n.26 (1984) (“[T]he recognition of a ‘penumbral zone’ within
which an inadvertent mistake would not call for exclusion, . . . will make it less tempting for judges
to bend fourth amendment standards to avoid releasing a possibly dangerous criminal because of a
minor and unintentional miscalculation by the police”) (quoting William A. Schroeder, Deterring
Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives To The Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L. J. 1361, 1420-21
(1981)); Bellin, supra note 216, at 6 (“[E]xplicit consideration of crime severity would minimize
doctrinal distortions that inevitably arise . . . when courts must judge all searches and seizures by the
same standard.”).
246. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 3.2(a) at 32; see also Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) in which Justice Jackson, in his dissent, stated:
But if we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment . . . it seems to me
they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense. If we assume, for
example, that a child is kidnapped and the officers throw a roadblock about the
neighborhood and search every outgoing car, . . . I should candidly strive hard to sustain
such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be reasonable to
subject travelers to such an indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened life and
detect a vicious crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal
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For all these reasons, the seriousness of the offense should not be
completely irrelevant to the probable cause determination. Instead, the
realities of the real world of law enforcement “should be recognized and
[the use of this factor] legitimated.”247 Probable cause is not a precise
concept. 248 Consequently, consideration of the seriousness of the
offense does not require, and would not really benefit from, “the use of
some fine-spun theory whereby each offense in the criminal code has its
own probable-cause standard.” 249 Rather, all that is necessary is to
recognize the common-sense notion “that murder rape, armed robbery,
and the like, call for a somewhat different police response than, say,
gambling, prostitution, or possession of narcotics.” 250 Apocalyptic
crimes should be put into a special category. 251 Recognizing and
legitimating a factor which everyone knows to be influential makes it
easier for the courts, in close cases, to avoid bending Fourth Amendment
standards to avoid results that seem disproportionate and at odds with
common sense. Llagano and the notion of probable cause as a zone, not
a point, illustrate how this approach could work.

search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.
247. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 3.2(a) at 33 (suggesting that
“[p]erhaps this is the correct conclusion”).
248. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 366 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Probable
cause . . . is not a model of precision”); BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 1986)
(“Probable cause is a fluctuating concept”); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir.
1985) (“probable cause . . . describes not a point but a zone, within which the graver the crime the
more latitude the police must be allowed”); People v. Hearty, 644 P.2d 302, 309 (Colo. 1982)
(“Probable cause is measured by ‘reasonableness’ not by pure mathematical probability.”).
249. “Street Encounters,” supra note 197, at 57. See also 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
supra note 57, 3.2(a) at 33 (“Certainly it would be undesirable if each offense . . . had its own
probable cause standard”); Schroeder, The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra note 188, at 499
(“[L]inedrawing [and categorization are] . . . necessary substitute[s] for case-by-case
adjudication.”); Bellin, supra note 216, at 25-26.
250. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, §3.2(a) at 33; see also Llaguno, 763
F.2d at 1565-66 (“The shooting of seven persons (four fatally) by a team of criminals in the space of
two hours is about as grave a crisis as a local police department will encounter. The police must be
allowed more leeway in resolving it than when they are investigating the theft of a bicycle.”); People v.
Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140 (Cal. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973) (“the ‘gravity of the
offense’ is an appropriate factor to take into consideration” in determining whether an emergency
existed that justified the searching officers’ decision to forego obtaining a warrant); State v. Clark,
544 P.2d 1372, 1379 (Kan. 1976) (the seriousness and nature of the offense is a factor in
determining whether a warrantless arrest is reasonable); see also 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
supra note 57, §3.2(a) at 35 (suggesting that a massive civil disorder or other explosive situation
might justify a lowering of the probable cause standard).
251. Schroeder, The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra note 188, at 546-552; see also
Llaguno, 763 F.2d at 1565-66 (referring to crimes that are serious, but not “apocalyptic”).
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V. REVISITING ATWATER
The Court’s decision in Atwater was based in part on its analysis of
history and, in part on its assessment of reasonableness and a proper
balance of interests. Powerful arguments have been made that that the
Court’s interpretation of history is not supported by “the constitutional
text, nor [by] . . . what we know of the intentions of the ‘Framers.’”252
One author has said that the Court’s historical analysis “bear[s] little
resemblance to authentic framing-era arrest doctrine” and “consist[s] . . .
almost entirely of rhetorical ploys and distortions of the historical
sources.” 253 The historical issue will not be revisited here. Instead, this
article will focus on the Court’s efforts to achieve what it called “a
responsible [or reasonable] Fourth Amendment balance.” 254
A.

Fourth Amendment Reasonableness: The Balancing of Interests

The Supreme Court has had great difficulty settling on a single
theory as to the precise relationship between the probable cause clause
and the reasonableness clause. 255 From time to time the Supreme Court
has appeared to take the position that all searches and seizures must be
reasonable 256 and that the requirements of probable cause and a warrant
bear on the reasonableness of a search or seizure. 257 More often, the

252. See Sklansky, supra note 26, at 1813-14.
253. See Davies, supra note 27, at 246.
254. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).
255. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 48, 70
(1974) (noting the constantly shifting relationship between the two clauses and observing that “[t]he
Courts have said little of lasting significance about the relationship between the two clauses”); see
also Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing The Mischief of Camara and
Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 398 (1988) (“The Court’s basic inability to agree on when to use a
reasonableness standard instead of traditional probable cause evidences its failure in defining the
relationship between the warrant and reasonableness clauses.”); Schnapper, supra note 196, at 87173 (noting two lines of decisions); James A. McKenna, The Constitutional Protection of Private
Papers: The Role of a Hierarchical Fourth Amendment, 53 IND. L.J. 55 81-82 (1977).
256. See, e.g., Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S.Ct. 546, 548 (2009) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment . . . . . is ‘reasonableness.’”) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398
(2006)); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (“We have long held that the touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (stating that “the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is
always that searches and seizures be reasonable”).
257. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559 (1978) (stating that “[t]he Fourth
Amendment has itself struck the balance between privacy and public need,” but adding that
“‘reasonableness’ is the overriding test of compliance with the Fourth Amendment”); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (“The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a
decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But
reasonableness is still the ultimate standard.”).
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Court has suggested that the reasonableness analysis is a distinct
approach to Fourth Amendment problems that is appropriate only in
certain settings. 258
Whatever the exact relationship between the clauses, “‘the
balancing of competing interests’ . . . [is] ‘the key principle of the Fourth
Amendment.’” 259 The Supreme Court has often said that “[t]he
touchstone of . . . analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental
invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’” 260 A determination of
reasonableness requires a court to “consider the scope of the particular
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for
initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted” and balance this
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify
the intrusion. 261
Rather than determining reasonableness by case-by-case balancing
in each individual case, the Court has generally resorted to a process of
categorization in which specific rules are applied to specific situations
on the basis of a perception that the nature of a particular intrusion or the
interests which justify an intrusion of a particular kind are sufficiently
distinct from those that justify other kinds of intrusions to warrant a

258. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (determining the reasonableness of
government actions initiated on the basis of a lesser justification than traditional probable cause,
requires “balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion [of personal rights] which the
search (or seizure) entails”); see also City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2632-33 (2010).
259. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,
700 n.12 (1981)).
260. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 360 (2001) (O’Connor J., dissenting) (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (per curium); United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (“What is reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances
surrounding the search or seizure.”).
261. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 118-19 (2001) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness and the
reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it
intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
300 (1999)); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 (“The determination of the standard of reasonableness
governing any specific class of searches requires ‘balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails.’”) (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37); United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221, 228 (1985) (the test of reasonableness involves balancing “the nature and quality of the
intrusion on personal security against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify
the intrusion”) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
The Supreme Court has observed that “regardless of the terminology used, the precise
content of most of the Constitution’s civil-liberties guarantees rests upon an assessment of what
accommodation between governmental need and individual freedom is reasonable.” Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643-44 (1987).
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distinct approach. 262 The Atwater Court said that “the preference for
categorical treatment of Fourth Amendment claims gives way to
individualized review when a defendant makes a colorable argument that
an arrest” was made in an extraordinary way, or, with excessive force.263
Having said this, the Court added another factor to the reasonableness
calculation—the government’s essential interest in readily administrable
rules 264 and balancing the benefits of a rule barring custodial arrests for
minor crimes against the impact of such a rule on law enforcement. 265
The Atwater Court rejected compelling arguments for a bar on most
custodial arrests for minor crimes 266 (however “minor” is defined), 267
because it saw unnecessary custodial arrests for minor offenses as few in
number, 268 and therefore the resultant “costs to society of underenforcement [if police were deterred from custodial arrests for more
serious offenses] could easily outweigh the costs to defendants of being
needlessly arrested and booked.” 269
The Atwater Court was wrong on at least five levels. First, the
number of unnecessary custodial arrests is probably not as few in
number as the Court believed. 270 Second, even if they are as infrequent

262. In large measure, the Supreme Court has analyzed Fourth Amendment problems by first
placing them in particular categories. See “Seizure” Typology, supra note 71, at 461. Even though
attempts at categorization are necessarily somewhat arbitrary, and inevitably lead to some analytical
overlapping, this article will follow a similar approach.
263. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352-53 (citing Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1989)).
264. Id. at 347-350.
265. Id. See also Note, Use of Deadly Force on Fleeing Felony Suspects, 99 HARV. L. REV.
244, 245 (1985) (Garner suggests that the reasonableness of seizures should be determined by
weighing “the infringement of the individual’s interests caused by the police conduct against the
governmental interests served by such conduct.”).
266. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 360-73 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Subsequent to Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), several courts held unconstitutional custodial arrests for minor
offenses. See, e.g., State v. Hehman, 578 P.2d 527, 528 (Wash. 1978) (en banc); see also People v.
Clyne, 541 P.2d 71, 72-73 (1975) (en banc) (holding that custodial arrest of defendant for
hitchhiking violated statute and search incident thereto was thus improper).
267. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 348 & n.17 (stating that the Court’s reasoning applied to any majorminor crime distinction “whether ‘minor crime’ be defined as a fine-only traffic offense, a fine-only
offense more generally, or a misdemeanor)”; see also Schroeder, The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin,
supra note 188, at 503-34, 549-52 (discussing different approaches to distinguishing crimes for
Fourth Amendment purposes).
268. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353 (“[W]e are sure . . . the country is not confronting anything like
an epidemic of unnecessary misdemeanor arrests.”).
269. Id. at 351.
270. See STUART TAYLOR, JR & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT 52-55 (2007)
(stating that a certain detective Gottlieb regularly made custodial arrests of Duke students charged
with minor offenses while giving summons to townspeople arrested for more serious offenses);
Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte Blanche, 77 IND. L.
J. 419, 429-49 (2002) (stating that custodial arrests for traffic violations are not uncommon).
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as the Court says, this fact does not make the ones that occur more
reasonable. 271 If anything, that infrequency makes the few instances
where this “penalty” is imposed seem all the more arbitrary. Moreover,
the Court’s ruling is likely to embolden police officers and lead to more
such arrests. Third, the Court simply is not realistic about the impact of
a custodial arrest on the arrestee. 272 Fourth, the Court’s concerns about
the costs of under-enforcement are speculative and exaggerated. Fifth,
the Court failed to take into account the impact its ruling would have on
other areas of search and seizure law.
B.

The Consequences of a Custodial Arrest

Much of what is wrong with the Court’s decision in Atwater stems
from is its failure to recognize the profound consequences of custodial
arrest. If a person charged with a minor crime is subjected to a custodial
arrest, that arrest will, in most cases, be the most significant consequence
of the violation.273 A custodial arrest is an awesome and frightening
experience 274 that will have a profound and far reaching effect on the
arrestee. 275 The arrestee is abruptly constrained 276 and ordinarily
271. See, e.g., Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195-97 (11th Cir. 2002) (upholding custodial
arrest under statute that banned “[t]he sounding of any horn or signaling device on any automobile,
motorcycle, bus or other vehicle on any street or public place of the County, except as a danger
warning” but allowing excessive force claim to go forward); Kristal Roberts, Man Arrested for
Hocking Spit on Daytona sidewalk, ABC ACTION NEWS (Jan. 20, 2012),
http://www.abcactionnews.com/dpp/news/local_ news/water_colloer/ma-arrested-forhocking-spiton-daytona-sidewalk; cf. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 531 U.S. 769, 776 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(expressing hope that the Court “will reconsider its decision if experience demonstrates anything
like an epidemic of unnecessary minor offense arrests”).
272. Even before Atwater, it was suggested that the Court was simply not realistic about the
impact of an arrest on the arrestee. See Tracy Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the
Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV 732, 768 (1992).
273. See Brief for Petitioner at 27-28, Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (No. 99-1408),
2000 WL 1299527 (quoting William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MO. L. REV. 771, 779 (1993)).
274. See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 162, at 290-91 (1975) (“Being arrested
and held by the police, even if for a few hours, is, for most persons, awesome and frightening.”).
275. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 298 (1978) (“An arrest . . . is a serious matter for
any person even when no prosecution follows or when an acquittal is obtained”); United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (“A search may cause only annoyance
and temporary inconvenience to the law-abiding citizen . . . An arrest, however, is a serious personal
intrusion regardless of whether the person seized is guilty or innocent.”); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 776 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he invasion and disruption of a man’s life and
privacy which stem from his arrest are ordinarily far greater than the relatively minor intrusions
attending a search of his premises.”); Barrett, supra note 139, at 46-47 n.2.
276. See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 162, commentary at 291 (observing that
an arrest is ordered “on the spot” by a policeman who “stands ready then and there to back [it] up
with force”).
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searched incident to the arrest.277 He or she is then handcuffed; forcibly
taken to an unfamiliar place; booked; 278 probably fingerprinted; 279
photographed; 280 stripped of personal belongings 281 (which will
themselves be searched); 282 searched more extensively; 283 and held,
often in a “crowded, unsanitary, and dangerous place,”284 and sometimes
in the company of dangerous felons,285 until, and unless, he can obtain
277. See, e.g., Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-68 (recognizing the right to search incident to arrest
and defining permissible scope of such searches); cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 25657 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that even in the context of a custodial arrest, the
additional intrusion of a search incident thereto is significant).
278. See Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 605 (1968) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting) (observing that “booking” is required in most jurisdictions and describing “booking” as
“an administrative record of an arrest . . . made on the police ‘arrest book’ indicating, generally, the
name of the person arrested, the date and time of the arrest or booking, the offense for which he was
arrested, and other information”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST, THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT
INTO CUSTODY 304, 379-82 (Frank J. Remington ed, 1965) (discussing booking procedures)
[hereinafter LAFAVE, ARREST].
279. See LAFAVE, ARREST, supra note 278, at 379-80. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
160.10 (McKinney’s 2012).
280. See, e.g., Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 355 (2001) (Officers took Atwater’s
“photograph and placed her in a cell, alone, for about one hour, after which she was taken before a
magistrate, and released on $310 bond.”); see also State v. Klinker, 537 P.2d 268, 275 (Wash.
1975); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2630/2 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (“The Department [of State Police]
shall procure and file for record . . . photographs . . . measurements, descriptions and information of
all persons who have been arrested [in this state].”); Lawrence G. Newman, Note, Retention and
Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial Response, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 850, 850-51 (1971) (“The
practice of taking fingerprints, photographs, and other identification data of every person arrested by
local, state, and federal law enforcement officers . . . is well established.”).
281. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354-55; Id. at 364 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The arrestee is
subject to a full search of her person and confiscation of her possessions.”).
282. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
283. See, e.g., Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (upholding station house search
of person arrested for disorderly conduct); see also State v. McCabe, 708 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Mo.
App. 1986) (holding that a person who has been arrested may be searched at the police station
incident to a lawful arrest and as an inventory procedure); cf. State v. Jetty, 579 P.2d 1228, 1229-30
(Mont. 1978) (where “a local resident, [was] arrested at 3 a.m. for failure to pay an overdue one
dollar parking ticket,” but was never booked, it was unconstitutional to search him for weapons and
contraband prior to placing him in a holding cell).
284. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520 (2012); see also Mireya
Navarro, As Suspects Wait, the Fear of Tuberculosis Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1992, at B1
(observing that persons held in New York City jails are at risk of contracting tuberculosis); William
Glaberson, Trapped in the Terror of New York’s Holding Pens, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1990, at A1.
285. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1518-19 (observing that Florence was held in a facility that admits
more than 25,000 inmates each year and houses about 1,000 gang members at any given time and
noting the “grave threats posed by the increasing number of gang members who go through the
intake process,” and who, once admitted, “orchestrate thefts, commit assaults, and approach inmates
in packs to take contraband from the weak” putting everyone, “including detainees being held for a
minor offense,” at risk); see also Atwater, 532 U.S. at 364 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that
“[b]ecause people arrested for all types of violent offenses may be housed together, . . . this
detention period is potentially dangerous”).
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his release. 286 If the arrest was made while the arrestee was in a vehicle
the vehicle will probably be impounded and an inventory search
conducted. 287 The arrestee may lose time from work, 288 or school, and
may lose contact with family and friends.289 He may suffer emotional
distress 290 and public humiliation,291 and will probably be required to
retain an attorney and spend money on bail. 292 His “release may be
accompanied by burdensome conditions that impose a significant
restraint on his liberty.” 293 If the detention is at all prolonged, he may
lose his job or suffer other adverse consequences. 294
In addition to its direct consequences, any arrest, even a noncustodial arrest for a minor offense, 295 carries with it serious, long-term,
One author has expressed the view that the in-the-presence requirement for misdemeanor
arrests grew out of an early nineteenth century recognition of “[t]he deplorable conditions of jails
and the resulting need to protect individuals from mistaken or arbitrary arrest.” J. Terry Roach,
Comment, The Presence Requirement and the Police-Team Rule in Arrest for Misdemeanors, 26
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119, 120 n.8 (1969) (citing David Kauffman, The Law of Arrest in Maryland,
5 MD. L. REV. 125 (1941)).
286. See, e.g., Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354 (Atwater was held for about one hour, “after which
she was taken before a magistrate and released on $310 bond”). See also County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-59 (1991) (a probable cause hearing should be held within forty-eight
hours).
287. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1986).
288. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (“The consequences of prolonged
detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest.”).
289. See, e.g., Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1976). The inconvenience, of
course, is all the greater if the arrest or search takes place during the nighttime. Cf. Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
290. See, e.g., Atwater, 532 U.S. at 370 (O’Conner, J., dissenting) (Atwater’s son was
traumatized and subsequently had to be treated by a psychologist); Thomas v. E.J. Korvette, Inc.,
329 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (E.D.Pa 1971), rev’d, 478 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1973) ((noting that wrongfully
arrested plaintiff suffered injury to his feelings, humiliation, and embarrassment); see also Barbara
C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century: A Fourth Amendment Solution to
Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. Q. 221, 257 (1989) (noting the
“indignity, powerlessness, and inconvenience occasioned by a custodial arrest”).
291. See, e.g., Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354 (“Atwater’s arrest was surely humiliating”); Lykken v.
Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585, 596 (D. Minn. 1973); Thomas, 329 F. Supp at 1169; see also Gramenos
v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 440 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028 (1987) (noting
the “sheer embarrassment” of an arrest).
292. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Richman Gordman, Inc., 215 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Neb. 1974)
(plaintiffs were “confined in the local jail for 3 1/2 to 4 hours, fingerprinted and ‘mugged’ for
permanent FBI records, charged with a criminal offense, and compelled to retain counsel for their
defense. . . ”).
A custodial arrest may be particularly burdensome when it takes place away from the
arrestee’s home, especially when it takes place in another state. See Oleson v. Pincock, 251 P. 23,
25 (Utah 1926).
293. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
294. “Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and
imperil his family relationships.” Id.
295. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 298 (1978) (“Even the routine traffic arrests made
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collateral consequences for the arrestee.296 Even if charges against the
arrestee are ultimately dropped, or if he or she is found not guilty, 297 the
records of the arrest will often be retained and disseminated among
police agencies, 298 and on the internet. 299 Moreover, widespread public
feeling that “where there’s smoke, there’s fire” will often leave even the
acquitted defendant forever under a cloud of suspicion. 300 The result
will often be lost employment opportunities,301 lost educational
by [a] state trooper . . . can intrude on the privacy of the individual. In stopping cars, they may,
within limits, require a driver or passengers to disembark and even search them for weapons,
depending on time, place and circumstances.”).
296. See Jeremiah Rygus, Collateral Damage: Saddling Youth with a Lifetime of
Consequences, 26 CRIM. JUST. 37 (Winter 2012); Hon. Cynthia Diane Stephens, Keeping an Arrest
from Resulting in a Life Sentence in an Age of Full Disclosure of Criminal Records, 87-NOV MICH.
BAR J. 29 (2008); Margaret Colgate Love, The Debt That Can Never Be Paid: A Report Card on the
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 21 CRIM. JUST. 16 (Fall 2006).
297. See Foley, 435 U.S. at 298 (“An arrest . . . is a serious matter for any person even when
no prosecution follows or when an acquittal is obtained.”).
298. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2630/3(A) (West 2013) (requiring retention of arrest
information and its dissemination “to peace officers of the United States, of other states or
territories, of the Insular possessions of the United States, of foreign countries duly authorized to
receive the same, [and] to all peace officers of the State of Illinois”); Barrett, supra note 139, at 47
n.2; Donald L. Doernberg & Donald H. Zeigler, Due Process Versus Data Processing: An Analysis
of Computerized Criminal History Information Systems, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1110, 1114 (1980)
(observing that arrest records are generally maintained even when the arrestee is acquitted or the
charges against him are dismissed); Retention and Dissemination of Arrest Records, supra note 280,
at 852-53; cf. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 160.50 (McKinney 1992) (specifying procedures for the
return of fingerprints and photographs and providing that if a criminal action terminates in favor of
an accused the record shall be sealed).
299. See, e.g, INSTANT CHECKMATE, http://www.instantcheckmate.com; INTELIUS,
http://www.intelius.com/; U.S. CRIMINAL CHECKS, INC., https://www.criminalcbs.com/; CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECK, http://backgroundchecks.org/; see also JUDICI!, http://www.judici.com
(many Illinois counties). Records are also available through county clerks’ online sites. See, e.g.,
www.circuitclerk.co.jackson.il.us.
300. See In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 458-59 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1947)
(“The stigma [of a wrongful arrest] cannot be easily erased . . . [and] is seldom wiped out by a
subsequent judgment of not guilty. Frequently, the public remembers the accusation, and still
suspects guilt, even after an acquittal.”); see also Retention and Dissemination of Arrest Records,
supra note 280, at 864-65 (discussing uses of arrest records outside the criminal justice system).
Expungement is unlikely to provide a full and complete remedy. See Amy Shlosberg, Evan
Mandery, & Valerie West, The Expungement Myth, 75 ALB. L. REV 1229 (2011-12); Clay Calvert
& Jerry Bruno, When Cleansing Criminal History Clashes With the First Amendment and Online
Journalism: Are Expungement Statutes Irrelevant in the Digital Age?, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
123, 135 (2010).
301. It is very difficult to move beyond the stigmatizing effects of a criminal record. See
Criminal Background Checks Upend Job Search for Some Unemployed, HUFFINGTONPOST (May
25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/24/criminal-background-check_n_840195.html.
In 1996, approximately fifty percent of employers ran background checks. By 2004, ninety-six
percent did so. See Chad Terhune, The Trouble with Background Checks, BUSINESS WEEK (May
28, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-05-28/the-trouble-with-background-checks.
Some employers are barred by statute and regulation from hiring or continuing to employ anyone
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opportunities, 302 and future law enforcement scrutiny. 303 Convictions, of
course, can lead to even more severe consequences. 304
with a criminal record. See 12 U.S.C. § 5104(b)(2)(A) (West 2013) (applicants in “any State for
licensing and registration as a State-licensed loan originator”) and 75 Fed. Reg. 44656, 44674 (West
2013) (must have “not been convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to, a felony in a
domestic, foreign, or military court—(A) during the seven-year period preceding the date of the
application for licensing and registration; or (B) at any time preceding such date of application, if
such felony involved an act of fraud, dishonesty, or a breach of trust, or money laundering). There
is no de minimus exception to the statute’s bar on hiring or continuing to employ anyone with a
criminal record for dishonesty or breach of trust. See Victor Epstein, Low-level workers fired
because of new banking standards, USA TODAY (Aug. 26, 2012, 6:01 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-08-26/banks
fire-low-levelworkers/57334450/1 (employee fired for forty-nine year old conviction for stealing ten cents).
Other employers, as a matter of policy, will not hire applicants who have a record of arrests for
anything other than minor traffic violations. See, e.g., Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp.
401, 403 (D.C. Cal. 1970) (holding that company “policy of excluding from employment persons
who have suffered a number of arrests without any convictions . . . is unlawful under Title VII”).
Applicants for most professional licenses, including bar applicants, must ordinarily acknowledge all
arrests without regard to their final disposition. See generally, Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character
as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 520-21 (1985).
Recently, the EEOC has limited employers’ ability to consider criminal histories. See
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CONSIDERATIONS OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS
IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (Apr. 25, 2012),
available at 2012 WL 1499883; Am. Bar. Assoc. Section of Labor & Emp’t Law, EEOC Issues
Comprehensive Guidance Regarding Employers’ Use of Criminal Background Information, HOT
TOPIC:
LABOR
AND
EMP’T
LAW
NEWS
(Apr.
25,
2012),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ll_hottopics/2012_aball_hottopics
/5-2012hot_guidance.html.
302. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1091 (2012) (rendering ineligible for federal education aid (for
varying time periods) any “student who is convicted of any offense under Federal or State law
involving the possession or sale of a controlled substance [while a student]”) (emphasis added); 12
U.S.C. § 1829 (West 2013) (rendering certain offenders ineligible for employment in a FDIC
insured banking institution).
303. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979) (“[A]n indictment will
often have a devastating personal and professional impact that a later dismissal or acquittal can
never undo.”); Thomas v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1163, 1166-69 (E.D. Pa, 1971), rev’d,
478 F.2d 471 (3d. Cir. 1973) (acknowledging that former security manager who was charged with
employee theft but found not guilty, was thereafter unable “to obtain employment in the security
field.”); cf. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 344-45 (1990) (holding that the mere fact that a
person has been acquitted of a particular offense does not render evidence of that offense
inadmissible as part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief in a subsequent prosecution for another
offense); Smith v. State, 409 So.2d 455, 457 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (same).
304. See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971) (“The practical effects of conviction of
even petty offenses of the kind involved here are not to be minimized. . . . The collateral
consequences of conviction may be even more serious, as when (as was apparently a possibility in
this case) the impecunious medical student finds himself barred from the practice of medicine
because of a conviction he is unable to appeal for lack of funds.”); Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and
Reflections About Gideon v. Wainwright, 33 STETSON L. REV. 280, 284 (2003) (“The stigma of any
criminal conviction, including a misdemeanor conviction that results in a fine, is significant. Any
misdemeanor conviction in a person’s past, except for a minor traffic offense, makes it difficult for
that person to gain entry into medical school or law school, to obtain certain jobs, or to enter the
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The consequences of an erroneous arrest are sufficiently severe that
substantial civil damages have been awarded to persons improperly
arrested for minor offenses. 305 The severity of these consequences,
however, did not deter the Atwater court from holding that custodial
arrests for minor crimes were constitutionally reasonable. Florence
allows the police to add another major consequence—a strip search—to
the arrestee’s experience.
The facts in Florence are especially egregious. For that reason,
they are worth reproducing as the Supreme Court recited them. In 1998,
according to the Supreme Court, Albert Florence pleaded guilty to two
relatively minor offenses and was sentenced to two days in jail, two
years probation, and ordered to pay a fine in monthly installments. 306
When he fell behind on his payments and failed to appear at an
enforcement hearing, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. He paid
the outstanding balance less than a week later; but for some unexplained
reason, the warrant remained in a statewide computer database.
Two years later, in Burlington County, New Jersey, Florence and his
wife were stopped in their automobile by a state trooper. Based on the
outstanding warrant in the computer system, the officer arrested
petitioner and took him to the Burlington County Detention Center. He
military service”); ABA COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS AND THE PUB. DEFENDER
SERV. FOR THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA, INTERNAL EXILE, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CONVICTION IN FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS (Jan. 2009), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cecs/internalexile.authcheckdam.pdf.
305. See, e.g., McClellan v. Smith, No. 1:0-cv-1141, 2009 WL 3587431 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 23,
2009) ($150,000 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages); Zellner v.
Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344 (2d Cir. 2007); Thomas, 329 F.Supp. at 1169-71 ($750,000 jury verdict,
including $250,000 actual damages, reduced on appeal to compensatory damages of $100,000 and
$50,000 in punitive damages); Gaszak v. Zayre of Illinois, Inc., 305 N.E.2d 704, 711-12 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1973) ($10,500 verdict); Schmidt v. Richman Gordman, Inc., 215 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Neb. 1974)
($10,500 reduced on appeal to $10,000); see also Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests,
supra note 228 (containing an earlier discussion of the information contained in footnotes 273-303
and accompanying text) (cited in Brief of Amicus Curiae Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Ass’n in
Support of Petitioners, Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (No. 99-1408), 2000 WL
1341293; Brief of Respondents at 38, Atwater, 532 U.S. 318, (No. 99-1408), 2000 WL 1659099;
Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of Texas, the MexicanAmerican Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the National Police Accountability Project of
the National Lawyer’s Guild in Support of Petitioners at 20, Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 (No. 99-1408),
2000 WL 1341276; Brief of Amicus Curiae for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. in
Support of Neither Party at 7, Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 (No. 99-1408), 2000 WL 1280456; Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12, Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 (No. 991408), 2000 WL 1673201).
306. The original charges were obstruction of justice and use of a deadly weapon after fleeing
police officers in an automobile. Florence pleaded guilty to hindering prosecution and obstructing
the administration of law. Brief for Respondents at 6, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132
S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 3739474.
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was held there for six days and then was transferred to the Essex
County Correctional Facility. . . .
Burlington County jail procedures required every arrestee to shower
with a delousing agent. Officers would check arrestees for scars,
marks, gang tattoos, and contraband as they disrobed. Petitioner
claims he was also instructed to open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold
out his arms, turn around, and lift his genitals. Petitioner shared a cell
with at least one other person and interacted with other inmates
following his admission to the jail. . . .
The Essex County Correctional Facility . . . admits more than 25,000
inmates each year and houses about 1,000 gang members at any given
time. . . . [A]ll arriving detainees passed through a metal detector and
waited in a group holding cell for a more thorough search. When they
left the holding cell, they were instructed to remove their clothing
while an officer looked for body markings, wounds, and contraband.
Apparently without touching the detainees, an officer looked at their
ears, nose, mouth, hair, scalp, fingers, hands, arms, armpits, and other
body openings. This policy applied regardless of the circumstances of
the arrest, the suspected offense, or the detainee’s behavior, demeanor,
or criminal history. Petitioner alleges he was required to lift his
genitals, turn around, and cough in a squatting position as part of the
process. After a mandatory shower, during which his clothes were
307
inspected, petitioner was admitted to the facility.

Florence was released the next day, when the charges against him
were dismissed because, as finally became known, he had long ago
complied fully with the law.
C.

The Governmental Interests That Justify the Intrusion of a
Custodial Arrest

In the broadest sense, the government’s primary interest in arresting
any lawbreaker is to make the arrestee available for prosecution. 308 That
goal is advanced, at least potentially, by any arrest, custodial or noncustodial. The Atwater Court pointed to two reasons this goal would be
compromised if the police were not allowed to make custodial arrests for
“minor” offenses: (1) There would be administrative difficulties because
police officers would be required to make on-the-spot judgments about

307. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1514.
308. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 173 (2003); cf. LAFAVE, ARREST, supra note 278, at
437-89 (1965) (observing that many arrests for minor offenses are made for purposes other than
prosecution).
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the seriousness of offenses; (2) There would be a “systematic
disincentive” to make custodial arrests in close cases where such an
“arrest . . . would serve . . . important societal interest[s],” 309 because
police officers would face the prospect of evidentiary exclusion and
personal liability if their judgments were wrong. 310 In the absence of
custodial arrest, said the Court, evidence could be lost, some offenders
could flee and avoid prosecution, and some convictions could be lost.
All these concerns are illusory.
1. The Government’s Interest in Avoiding Administrative Barriers
to Law Enforcement
a. The Seriousness of the Offense and the Government’s
Interest in Easily Administered Rules
The Atwater Court premised its decision, in significant part, on its
belief that a rule requiring arresting officers to distinguish between
“minor” crimes and other crimes “on a moment’s notice,” would be
unmanageable. 311 The Court did not claim, however, (and could not
have credibly claimed), that the government’s interest in arresting and
convicting lawbreakers is the same in every case. Clearly, for example,
its interest in apprehending and convicting serial killers is greater than
its interest in convicting litterers. 312 Long before Atwater, the Court
recognized that variations in the government’s interest could translate
into different Fourth Amendment rules for different kinds of offenses.
In Welsh v. Wisconsin, 313 the Court observed that the penalty that
attaches to a crime is the best indicator of the government’s interest in
convicting people of that offense and explicitly held that the gravity of
the underlying offense for which the arrest is made is “an important
factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists”
that would justify a warrantless entry into a person’s home to make that
arrest. 314 The Court concluded that a warrantless entry into a person’s
home to effectuate that person’s arrest could not ordinarily be justified
where only “a minor offense, such as that at issue in this case” is
involved. 315
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
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The Welsh majority did not elaborate further on which offenses
were “minor” for purposes of warrantless home entries but observed that
by classifying driving while intoxicated as a “non-jailable traffic
offense” 316 and as a “noncriminal civil forfeiture offense” which carried
no possibility of imprisonment, the state of Wisconsin had differentiated
it from all other offenses. 317 However, in McArthur v. Illinois, 318
decided shortly after Atwater, the Court distinguished Welsh on the basis
that the crime in Welsh was non-jailable, whereas “[t]he evidence at
issue [in McArthur is] . . . of crimes that were jailable.”319 McArthur
arose out of the actions of police officers who barred McArthur from his
home while they went to get a warrant to search the home for drugs.
McArthur argued that the offense that the drugs could prove was too
minor to justify his exclusion from his home. The McArthur Court
rejected this argument and also noted that temporarily barring a person
from his home “is considerably less intrusive” than entering his home
and is permissible where the offense at issue was “jailable.”320
The Atwater Court could have taken a similar approach and said
that a custodial arrest for a non-jailable offense is at least as intrusive as
the warrantless home entry that was at issue in Welsh, and is therefore
unconstitutional absence exigent circumstances akin to those recognized
in Welsh. 321 The Atwater Court did not do this. Instead, it ignored
Welsh and took the position that a rule requiring arresting officers to
distinguish between “minor” offenders and other offenders “promise[d]
little in the way of administrability,” 322 because officers often would not
know in advance which offenses qualified as minor (however that term
was defined). 323 In the Court’s view such a rule was unnecessary, would
316. Id. at 742.
317. Id. at 754.
318. 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
319. Id. at 335-36.
320. See id. at 336 (declining to decide if the same restrictions on entry would have been
permissible “were only a ‘non-jailable’ offense at issue.”).
321. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (a
“persuasive claim might [be] made . . . that [a] custodial arrest . . . for a minor traffic violation
violate[s] the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . .”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 379
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that the “[c]riminal law has traditionally recognized a
distinction between essentially regulatory offenses and serious violations of the peace, and [has]
graduated the response of the criminal justice system” accordingly).
322. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 350 (2001).
323. Id. at 347-48. See also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 392
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (complaining that if “the suspected
infraction involved a street drug, the majority implies that it would have approved the scope of the
search. . . . Such a test is unworkable and unsound. School officials cannot be expected to halt
searches based on the possibility that a court might later find that the particular infraction at issue is
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require “sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need,”324
and could expose officers to the risk of a lawsuit or to the exclusion of
evidence if they erred on the side of custodial arrest. 325
Welsh was not the only pre-Atwater Fourth Amendment case to
consider the seriousness of the offense. A year after Welsh, in United
States v. Hensley, 326 the Court unanimously held that a police officer
may stop a person whom he or she reasonably suspects “was involved in
or is wanted in connection with a completed felony.” 327 The Hensley
Court did not limit such stops to felonies. Rather, it merely declined to
decide whether warrantless “Terry stops to investigate all past crimes,
however serious, are permitted.” 328
One week after Hensley, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 329 the Court held
that a student in a public school may be subjected to a search of his or
her person or belongings if “there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is
violating either the law or the rules of the school.” 330 The Court said the
intrusiveness of a search must be limited, “in light of the age and sex of
the student and the nature of the infraction.”331 However, in response to
Justice Stevens’ concerns, expressed in a separate opinion, that this
standard would permit searches for evidence of even the most trivial
violations of school rules, 332 the T.L.O. majority expressly stated that it
was “unwilling to adopt a standard under which the legality of a search
is dependent upon a judge’s evaluation of the relative importance of
various school rules.” 333
not severe enough to warrant an intrusive investigation.”).
324. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347.
325. Id. at 350.
326. 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
327. Id. at 229. The idea of limiting particular types of Fourth Amendment activities to
situations where a felony was involved was also raised in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980),
where the dissenters argued that historically warrantless arrests in the home could only be made for
felonies. Id. at 616-17 (White, J., dissenting).
328. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229. See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 689 n.1 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (“We have never suggested that all law enforcement objectives, such as
the investigation of possessory offenses, outweigh the individual interests infringed upon [by
investigatory stops].”).
329. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
330. Id. at 342; see also id. at 350 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring) (recapitulating the Court’s
holding in this language).
331. Id. at 342.
332. Id. at 377 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420, 450-52 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing similar concerns in the
context of minor traffic stops).
333. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.9; cf. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S.
364, 392 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (complaining that “[t]he
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A few months after T.L.O., the Court added a new wrinkle when it
focused on the nature of the harm that would be averted by the Fourth
Amendment action in question. In Tennessee v. Garner,334 the Court
characterized the felony-misdemeanor distinction as “highly technical,”
“minor,” and “arbitrary” and held that deadly force cannot be used to
seize a suspect simply because there is probable cause to believe that he
has committed a felony. 335 Instead, the Court, relying on the balancing
of interests that it said is at the core of the Fourth Amendment, held that
the use of such force to prevent the escape of a suspect, is
“constitutionally unreasonable” unless the officer also has “probable
cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm,
whether to the officer or to others.” 336
In Graham v. Connor, 337 the Court held all claims that a law
enforcement officer used excessive force in effecting a “seizure” should
be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard in
light of the facts and circumstances of each case.338 Reasonableness,
said the Court, must be determined from all the facts and circumstances,
“including the severity of the crime at issue.”339
Numerous pre-Atwater cases in state courts 340 and in lower federal
majority has placed school officials in this ‘impossible spot’ by questioning whether possession of
Ibuprofen and Naproxen causes a severe enough threat to warrant investigation. Had the suspected
infraction involved a street drug, the majority implies that it would have approved the scope of the
search. . . . In effect, then, the majority has replaced a school rule that draws no distinction among
drugs with a new one that does. As a result, a full search of a student’s person for prohibited drugs
will be permitted only if the Court agrees that the drug in question was sufficiently dangerous.”).
334. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
335. Id. at 14, 20.
336. Id. at 11. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec.’s Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), the Court
suggested that the magnitude of the harm that a Fourth Amendment activity is intended to avert is
relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. The Court ruled that railroad employees could be tested
for drug use without a warrant and without individualized suspicion, because the evil against which
such efforts were directed was not simply the violation of criminal laws against the possession of
drugs, but the “far more dangerous wrong” of performing “certain sensitive tasks while under the
influence of those substances.” Id. at 633.
Skinner’s emphasis on the harm the seizure was intended to avert is similar to Professor
LaFave’s suggestion that “a much more promising approach” than looking to the seriousness of the
offense is to take “into account the utility of the police action for purposes other than securing a
conviction.” 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, §3.2(a) at 33 (quoting United States
v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443, 452 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., dissenting)).
337. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
338. Id. at 395.
339. Id. at 396.
340. See, e.g., State v. Weist, 730 P.2d 26, 29 (Or. 1986) (“A warrant to rip apart a vehicle or tear
up the inside of a home in search of less than an ounce of marijuana (possession of which is a
violation. . . ) may well be unreasonable . . . . So might a warrant to rip apart a vehicle to see whether it
was registered in a manner constituting . . . a traffic infraction.”); State v. Niblock, 631 P.2d 661, 666
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courts 341 also recognized, in various Fourth Amendment contexts, that
the seriousness of the offense under investigation bears on whether a
particular Fourth Amendment activity is reasonable. Some post Atwater
cases contain similar suggestions.
Welsh, Garner, and Hensley suggest that the less serious the offense
under investigation, the greater the limits the Constitution imposes on
the kind of actions the government can take to investigate the offense
and to seize the offender.342 At the other end of the scale, some postAtwater cases suggest that a “grave” crime might justify greater
interference with individual liberty. In City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 343 the Court held that roadblocks could not be directed at
ordinary criminality not connected in some way with the use of the
That Court observed, however, that “the Fourth
highways. 344
Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored
roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a
dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route.”345
(Kan. 1981) (“the seriousness of the alleged offense” is a relevant factor “in evaluating police conduct in
making a warrantless arrest”); People v. Scott, 578 P.2d 123, 127 (Cal. 1978) (where probable cause
exists to believe that a bodily intrusion will yield relevant evidence, the court should only issue a warrant
if the balance of other factors, including “the seriousness of the underlying criminal offense,” so
suggests); People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140 (Cal. 1972) (“[T]he ‘gravity of the offense’ is an
appropriate factor to take into consideration” in determining whether an emergency existed that justified the
searching officers’ decision to forego obtaining a warrant.); see also People v. Stachelek, 495 N.E. 2d
984, 989 (Ill. App. 1986) (the seriousness and violent nature of a gang related murder was “[a]nother
relevant factor in determining whether the officers acted properly” in determining that they had probable
cause to arrest defendant); People v. Sanders, 374 N.E.2d 1315, 1317-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (applying
factors from Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970), including the seriousness of the
crime, to invalidate warrantless entry to arrest person suspected of burglary which is not “a grave
offense of violence”); People v. Johnson, 93 Cal. Rptr. 534, 537 (Ct. App. 1971) (“[T]he seriousness
of the offense allegedly committed” is relevant to whether police officers had probable cause to
arrest kidnapper described by child’s mother.).
341. See, e.g., Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he fact that a
multiple murderer is on the loose . . . may affect the judgment of what is reasonable. . . . Probable
cause . . . describes not a point but a zone, within which the graver the crime the more latitude the
police must be allowed.”); United States v. Holland, 510 F.2d 453, 455 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1010 (1975) (quoting Arnold v. United States, 382 F.2d 4, 7 (9th Cir. 1967)) (“The
reasonableness of . . . [an] on-the-scene detention is determined by all the circumstances
[including] . . . [t]he seriousness of the offense.”); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (holding that in determining whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry into a home
to make an arrest, one factor to be considered is whether a grave offense, particularly a crime of
violence, is involved); see also United States v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494, 498 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978) (following Dorman).
342. Cf. Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court, supra note 197, at 677 (“[T]he detection of
minor crimes might legitimize only minor invasions of privacy.”).
343. 531 U.S. 32 (2001).
344. Id. at 39-44.
345. Id. at 44.
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In Illinois v. Lidster, 346 the Court held that highway checkpoints to
obtain information from possible witnesses to a fatal hit and run accident
were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 347 The Court relied on
the three part test used in Brown v. Texas348 and observed “[p]olice were
investigating a crime that had resulted in a human death. . . . The stop
advanced this grave public concern to a significant degree.”349
The Supreme Court’s focus on the seriousness of the offense in
Fourth Amendment settings has been tentative and without direction. It
has not, however, been non-existent. Taken together, Welsh, Hensley,
Garner, and Graham, suggest: (1) a willingness on the part of the
Supreme Court to consider the seriousness of the offense in a wide range
of Fourth Amendment contexts, (2) uncertainty and ambivalence about
where the line or lines should be drawn between or among various kinds
of offenses, and (3) an assumption that if offenses are to be ranked for
Fourth Amendment purposes, they should be categorized and not ranked
individually on a case-by-case basis.
In his Welsh dissent, Justice White expressed fears that focusing on
the seriousness of the offense would “hamper law enforcement . . .
burden courts with pointless litigation concerning the nature and
gradation of crimes,” and “necessitate a case-by-case evaluation of the
seriousness of particular offenses.” 350 Those concerns are similar to the
“administrability” concerns expressed by the Atwater Court. However,
the Welsh Court’s use of generic terms such as “minor” and “jailable”
strongly suggests that the Welsh majority contemplated some process of
categorization and not case-by case adjudication of the seriousness of
each offense.
Hensley, Garner, McCarthur, and Lidster also used generic terms
in their efforts to distinguish some crimes from others. No one has
seriously argued that a case-by-case approach to the seriousness of the
crime should be used in Fourth Amendment settings. In fact, when the
idea has reared its head, it has been firmly rejected. 351
If a process of categorization is used, possible methodologies for
ranking crimes abound. 352 It is only necessary is to articulate clear
346. 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
347. Id. at 426-27.
348. 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
349. Id. at 427.
350. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S 740, 760-62 (1984) (White J., dissenting).
351. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14(1979) (extolling the virtues of
“[a] single, familiar standard . . . to guide police officers . . . .”).
352. See Schroeder, The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra note 188, at 503-34 (setting out
different possible classification schemes).
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distinctions that can easily be applied. Once a scheme is agreed upon for
distinguishing offenses for which custodial arrests are permissible from
those for which they are not permissible, a “no-custodial-arrest” rule for
minor offenses could be easily administered through the use of what the
Atwater Court referred to as “a simple tiebreaker . . . : if in doubt do not
arrest.” 353 The Court rejected this approach, however, on the ground it
“would boil down to something akin to a least restrictive alternative
limitation . . . generally thought inappropriate in working out Fourth
Amendment protection,” and would provide “a systematic disincentive
to arrest.” 354 On examination, the Court’s arguments do not hold water.
b. Evidentiary Exclusion, Personal Liability, and the
Government’s Interest in Avoiding a Systematic
Disincentive to Make Custodial Arrests
According to the Atwater Court, a rule barring custodial arrests for
minor offenders would address a largely non-existent problem because
very few custodial arrests are made for minor offenses 355 and would
therefore yield few benefits. However, “the prospect of evidentiary
exclusion or . . . personal § 1983 liability for the misapplication of a
constitutional standard” 356 would cause many officers to issue only
citations where a custodial arrest might have been appropriate. The
result would be a “systematic disincentive to arrest in situations
where . . . arresting would serve an important societal interest.” 357 The
Atwater Court was especially troubled by the possibility that an officer
might refrain from making a custodial arrest because he was “not quite
sure that the drugs weighed enough to warrant jail time,” or was not sure
whether the offense was a second offense. 358 “Multiplied many times
over, the costs to society of such under-enforcement could easily
outweigh the costs to defendants of being needlessly arrested and

353. 532 U.S. 318, 350 (2001).
354. Id. at 350-51.
355. Id. at 353 (observing that “when Atwater’s counsel was asked at oral argument for any
indications of comparably foolish, warrantless misdemeanor arrests, he could offer only one”). In
2002, 448,000 drivers were arrested during traffic stops. CHARACTERISTICS OF DRIVERS STOPPED
BY POLICE, 2002, supra note 92, at 5. Seventy-three percent of these drivers experienced a vehicle
or personal search. Police searched about 838,000 drivers in 2002. Of the drivers who were
searched, 39.3% were also arrested; about half of the drivers who were both searched and arrested,
were searched after police arrested them. Id. at 6.
356. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 350.
357. Id. at 351.
358. Id.
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booked.” 359
The Court’s concerns seem exaggerated. There is no reason to
believe there would be large numbers of cases where, out of an excess of
caution, an officer would issue a citation for a minor offense when
probable cause exists to justify a custodial arrest for a more serious
offense. 360 In many cases, an officer could resolve any doubts about the
seriousness of the offense by detaining and questioning the suspect
briefly in a Terry-type stop. Even if the officer was unable to resolve his
or her doubts, the chances are minimal that a mistake could result in
“legal action,” or “evidentiary exclusion,” because of a violation of the
constitution. 361 For one thing, probable cause does not require
certainty—it requires only a fair probability of criminal activity. 362
Probable cause “means less evidence than would justify . . . conviction,
[but] more than bare suspicion” 363 or reasonable suspicion. 364 Second,
an arrest generally is valid if the police had probable cause to arrest the
suspect for any offense. 365 An officer not quite certain about the weight
of the drugs, or about some other fact that would justify a custodial
arrest, would almost always have probable cause to make a noncustodial arrest for some offense. A decision not to take a suspect into
custody would therefore ordinarily not preclude an arrest; it would only
mean the loss of immediate custodial control over the suspect. Third,
the fact that an individual is arrested without probable cause does not
entitle him to terminate the prosecution.366 Fourth, as Justice O’Connor
pointed out in her Atwater dissent, officers would be protected from
liability by qualified immunity367 “if they arrest a suspect under the
mistaken belief that they have probable cause to do so, provided that the
359. Id. at 351.
360. Atwater seems to allow a custodial arrest for a minor offense even when that arrest is
motivated primarily by the officer’s suspicion of a more serious offense. Cf. Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
361. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 350.
362. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245, n.13 (1983).
363. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); see also Llaguno v. Mingey 763
F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Probable cause means . . . ‘more than bare suspicion, but less than
virtual certainty’. . . .[it] describes not a point but a zone, within which the graver the crime the
more altitude the police must be allowed.”).
364. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 n.4 (1987).
365. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-54 (2004); cf. McClellan v. Smith, No. 1:02-cv1141, 2009 WL 3587431 (N.D.N.Y Oct. 26, 2009) (suggesting that the Devenpeck doctrine would
not apply where there is probable cause to arrest a person for opening a car door in traffic and he is
instead, arrested for murder).
366. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
119 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952).
367. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 367 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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mistake is objectively reasonable.”368 Indeed, shortly after its decision
in Atwater, the Court expanded the protections afforded by the qualified
immunity doctrine.369 It is therefore unlikely that fear of suit alone
would cause large numbers of officers to issue a citation for a minor
offense when there was probable cause to make a custodial arrest for a
more serious offense. For all these reasons, even if some officers
occasionally erred on the side of caution and refrained from making
some legal custodial arrests, the direct costs of this “underenforcement”
would be low.
2. The Government’s Interest in Preventing Flight, Loss of
Evidence, and Lost Convictions
a. Flight
The Atwater Court expressed concern that a rule limiting custodial
arrests to minor crimes would, among other things, mean that “[a]n
officer not quite sure that the drugs weighed enough to warrant jail time
or not quite certain about a suspect’s risk of flight would not arrest, even
though it could . . . turn out that, in fact, the offense called for
incarceration and the defendant was long gone on the day of trial.” 370
This concern is inconsequential.
First, if a custodial arrest is possible but instead a citation is issued,
the offender still has an obligation to appear in Court. If he does not
appear, a bench warrant will issue for his arrest and he can be arrested at
a later date.
Second, in most cases where a citation is given for a minor offense
and it turns out a custodial arrest could have been made for a more
368. See, e.g., Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 478 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Ameren v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 832 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding doctrine inapplicable)); Lee v.
Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 2002) (‘“[A]ll that is required for qualified immunity to be
applicable to an arresting officer’” is that a ‘“reasonable officer . . . in the same circumstances and
possessing the same knowledge as the Defendant[] could have believed that probable cause existed
to arrest.’”) (quoting Scarbough v. Miles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001)).
369. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 205 (2001), stating that the immunity inquiry:
must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition; . . . The concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable
mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct. It is
sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will
apply to the factual situation the officer confronts. An officer might correctly perceive
all of the relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding . . . [of the law]. If the
officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is
entitled to the immunity defense.
370. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 351.
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serious offense, the latter will still be a relatively minor offense. “The
seriousness of the offense with which a suspect may be charged . . .
bears on the likelihood that he will flee and escape apprehension if not
arrested immediately.” 371 Minor offenders have less to fear from
prosecution than serious offenders and therefore have less incentive to
flee, to resist arrest by force, or to engage in other activities that
endanger police officers or others. 372 In fact, for most minor offenders,
the costs and risks of serious efforts to flee or otherwise evade arrest are
prohibitive given the minor consequences of conviction. 373
Third, in many misdemeanor cases, particularly those that occur in
the officer’s presence, the identity of the suspect is known or strongly
suspected. 374 In traffic cases, the officer has access to the offender’s
driver’s license and registration. There is little prospect of successful
flight and finding the suspect should be relatively easy.
Fourth, even if a custodial arrest were made for the more serious
offense, the defendant will ordinarily be able, in some legal way, to
secure his release before trial. If he is determined to flee, he will
probably eventually be able to do so despite a custodial arrest.
Fifth, if a person who has committed a more serious offense is
released with a summons, he may develop a misplaced confidence that
the police have no serious interest in him. Some such persons may not
even know they have committed, or are suspected of, another offense.375
For all these reasons, it is unlikely that significant numbers of
persons given summonses will flee or escape apprehension if the police
371. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S 740, 759 (1984) (White, J., dissenting).
372. See EDWARD C. FISHER, THE LAWS OF ARREST 189 (1987) (observing that at common
law persons accused of breaches of the peace were “not considered likely to resort to desperate
measures to escape punishment, as was quite likely to be the case of one who had committed a
felony”).
373. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 61, § 1.2, at 10. The
overwhelming majority of minor offenders are charged in state court. Many of their offenses are
traffic-related and result only in small fines. “[T]he vast majority” of defendants whose cases
started as misdemeanors “will be sentenced to a fine and/or some form of community service. Id.
§ 1.4 at 28. “[F]ew are sentenced to incarceration.” Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S.
Ct. 1510, 1524 (2012) (Alioto, J., concurring). Even in the federal system, where more serious
offenses are usually involved, less than half of all non-drug, non-violent offenders convicted in
federal court from 1980 through 1986 received prison sentences. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1989, at 5.26 (1989).
374. See, e.g., Welsh, 466 U.S. at 342-43; State v. Koziol, 338 N.W.2d 47, 47-48 (Minn.
1983); see also Mendelson, supra note 113, at 504 (“[I]t makes no sense to arrest someone for a
noisy muffler where there is reliable identification and reasonable assurance that the ticket will be
obeyed.”).
375. See, e.g., People v. Strelow, 292 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that
“[t]he defendant testified that he was unaware of the speeding violation. . . . [W]e are therefore not
persuaded that Mr. Strelow was cognizant of the officer’s purpose in following him.”).
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must wait before arresting them. 376
b. Loss of Evidence
A bar on custodial arrests for certain offenses would translate into a
bar on searches incident to arrests for those offenses. Because a search
for evidence ordinarily is not permitted on the basis of mere suspicion,377
an officer making a non-custodial arrest will be unable, incident to that
arrest, to search for evidence that he or she reasonably suspects is in the
arrestee’s possession. In many misdemeanor cases, however, there is no
evidence to be found. 378 In others, all the evidence has long since been
gathered. In those few cases in which evidence remains to be gathered,
minor offenders are probably less likely than serious offenders to be
alert to the need to destroy evidence and are less likely to actually do
so. 379 Finally, the issuance of a citation is not necessarily the end of the
matter. While writing the citation the officer can seek consent to search.
Because the stop is not, by definition, custodial, 380 the officer can also
question the suspect unhindered by Miranda.
c. Lost Convictions
Occasionally, a rule barring custodial arrests for minor offenses
could mean some crime that could otherwise have been prosecuted will
go unpunished. As Justice Scalia said, however, in Arizona v. Hicks,381
“[T]here is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution
376. See KAMISAR, ET AL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 112, at 336 (speaking
in terms of offenders generally and observing that “the risk is negligible that the defendant will
suddenly flee between the time the police solve the case and the time which would be required to
obtain and serve an arrest warrant.”); 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, § 6.1(b) at
573 & n.50 (same, noting that it is unlikely that “prospective arrestees, as a class, pose the same risk
of disappearance as objects believed to be in a moving vehicle”); cf. United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (stating that “[r]estraining police action until after probable cause is
obtained . . . might . . . enable the suspect to flee in the interim and to remain at large”).
377. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-28 (1987).
378. See, e.g., People v. Mercurio, 88 Cal. Rptr 750, 751 (Ct. App. 1970) (“A traffic violation
ordinarily involves no tangible property; hence no implement or truit [sic] of the crime or infraction
will be found . . . [by a] search.”).
379. See State v. Lloyd, 606 P.2d 913, 919 (Haw. 1980) (“[N]ot every suspect . . . will attempt
to escape or destroy valuable, albeit illicit, merchandise.”). In some cases, the police could take
steps to prevent the destruction or loss of evidence. See, e.g., McArthur v. Illinois, 531 U.S. 326,
335-36 (2001) (temporarily keeping defendant from entering his home while police obtained a
search warrant).
380. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) (“[T]he usual traffic stop is more
analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’” and a driver stopped for a routine traffic violation is therefore
“not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.”).
381. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
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sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the
privacy of us all.” 382 Countless crimes go unreported and unprosecuted;
the addition of a few more to the list is not consequential.
Most of the crimes that might go unprosecuted as a consequence of
a rule barring some custodial arrests would be relatively minor. In
almost all of the “under-enforcement” situations with which the Court
was concerned, the more serious offense is similar in kind but different
in degree from the less serious offense. In the vast majority of cases the
uncertainty lies not in whether the arrestee who appears guilty of
underage drinking may actually be guilty of murder;383 the uncertainty
lies in whether the arrestee had a larger quantity of drugs instead of a
smaller quantity of drugs or, in whether an apparent larceny exceeded
some arbitrary dollar amount or was a second such offense. The
penalties may be more severe for greater amounts of drugs or property
but the offenses are not morally different and the costs to society of a
lost prosecution are not significantly greater. Extreme examples, such as
that given by the Court in Atwater where a failure to restrain a child
could turn into felony child endangerment, 384 demonstrate, not the
possibility of a serious crime going unpunished, but the growing
tendency of the law to over-criminalize and over-punish relatively
innocuous behaviors.
Minor regulatory crimes, and minor thefts and drug cases, and their
slightly bigger brothers, are not the kind of crimes that cry out for
punishment or retribution. In many instances, the pursuit of minor
offenders is motivated more by a desire to raise revenue than to control a
social problem. 385 In fact, most minor offenders are never
382. Id. at 329.
383. At least one well-known criminal, Tim McVeigh, was apprehended when stopped for a
minor offense. However, McVeigh was not taken into custody for that offense. See, e.g., Richard
Serrano, Trooper Testifies About McVeigh’s Arrest, L.A TIMES, Apr. 29, 1997, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/1997-04-29/news/mn-53622_1_mcveigh-trooper-testifies (stating that
McVeigh was pulled over for not having a license plate but taken into custody because he had a
gun).
384. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 349 n.20 (2001).
385. It has been argued that the pursuit of minor offenders can reduce the number of major
crimes:
First articulated in a 1982 essay for the Atlantic Monthly, the broken windows theory
suggests that the slippery slope to lawlessness begins when a community starts tolerating
relatively minor violations of public order—vandalism of abandoned structures, minor
traffic violations, loitering and the like—and that cracking down on such nuisances
discourages more serious crimes such as robbery, burglary and assault.
Brian Dickerson, Broken Windows theory of Community Policing will get major Test in Detroit,
DETROIT FREE PRESS (May 24, 2012),
http://www.freep.com/article/20120524/COL04/205240458/Brian-Dickerson-Broken-windows-
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apprehended. 386 Many of those who are arrested are not prosecuted, 387
or are acquitted. 388 Even when the offense is one for which
incarceration is a possible penalty, few minor offenders who are
convicted actually serve jail time. 389
Although “[t]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not the defeat
of certain criminal laws,” 390 in most cases involving minor offenses
there is no real loss if the offender goes unpunished. If the offender
continues to reoffend, he will ultimately be caught and prosecuted. If he
is scared straight by his close brush with the law or, for some other
reason does not reoffend and goes on to lead a good life, then most of
society’s legitimate goals have been accomplished.
In truth, in many cases of minor criminality, the offender and
society might both be better off if the crime had never been detected and
the offender never prosecuted. 391 Often the damage done to the offender
by prosecution far outweighs the harm done to society by his or her
offense. 392 The damage done by the arrest is only part of that cost. In
her Atwater dissent, Justice O’ Connor explained that “[a]rresting
Atwater, . . . taught the children . . . that ‘the bad person could just as
easily be the policeman as it could be the most horrible person they
could imagine.’” 393 Killing a fly with a hand grenade is not the way to
teach people to respect the law and the judicial system. Exposing
theory-of-community-policing-will-get-major-test-in-Detroit. “Although some critics suggest its
impact has been overstated, broken windows policing is generally credited with contributing to
dramatic reductions of crime in New York and Los Angeles.” Id.
386. Often, the police make a conscious decision not to arrest minor offenders. See LAFAVE,
ARREST, supra note 278, at 161-64.
387. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 61, §1.2, at 10 n.3; ¶1.4 at 2122 & n.4 (noting that thirty to sixty percent of felony arrests are dropped as a result of pretrial
screening, and stating that a high percentage of misdemeanor cases are also rejected, but observing
that “available statistics . . . are quite sparse”).
388. See, e.g., Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 434 (7th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481
U.S. 1028 (1987) (defendant acquitted of shoplifting).
389. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1524 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“In some cases, the charges are dropped. . . . In the end, few [individuals arrested for
minor offenses] are sentenced to incarceration.”).
390. Donald Dripps, Driving with Leon, 95 YALE L. J. 906, 920 (1986).
391. See David A.J. Richards, Liberalism, Public Morality, and Constitutional Law:
Prolegomenon to a Theory of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 51 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS.
123, 143 (1988) (noting that many laws creating victimless crimes “may be subject to cogent
criticism on the ground that they cause more social evil and injustice than they remedy”).
392. For a first offender, the impact of the collateral consequences of minor convictions often
far outweighs the impact of the small fine or other minor sanction that is the direct consequence.
Indeed, “[a]t times, the collateral consequences of a conviction are so severe that we are unable to
deliver a proportionate penalty.” Robert M. A. Johnson, Message from the President: Collateral
Consequences, THE PROSECUTOR, May 2001.
393. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 370 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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ordinary citizens to the inside of a jail cell, to other inmates, and to the
workings of the lower echelons of the criminal justice system, 394 is not
likely to instill respect for the law and the judicial system.
3. Other “Important Societal Interests” that Could be Compromised
by Limits on the Power to Make Custodial Arrests
The Atwater Court referred to other “important societal interest[s]”
that might be served by custodial arrests,395 but which could be
compromised if custodial arrests were barred for some offenses.
a. Continuing Offenders
The Atwater Court referred to “[t]he chronic speeder [who] will
speed again despite a citation in his pocket,” 396 to illustrate its concern
about the minor offender who will continue to offend unless taken into
custody. In fact, if the chronic speeder speeds immediately, he will be
given another ticket immediately. If he gets enough tickets, he will lose
his license—the penalty the law provides. A custodial arrest only
postpones for a few days—until the offender’s release on bail—the new
offenses.
Restraint may be important where driving while intoxicated is
concerned, or in other cases where there is some temporary impairment
or motive to misbehave, but in most cases there is neither. In reality,
most minor offenders will simply continue to go about their lawful
business until their court dates. Those who are inclined to commit more
offenses are unlikely to do significant damage.
A few days in jail may, perhaps, have some long-term deterrent
effect. That fact, however, should not justify a custodial arrest if an
offense is not punishable by jail time. The penalties provided by the
relevant law tell us how much deterrence society wants. A police officer
should not be able to unilaterally impose a greater penalty in the hope of
achieving greater deterrence.
b. Officer Safety
Most searches incident to custodial arrests, like suspicion-less strip
searches in detention centers, are motivated, at least in part, by concerns
394.

See generally STEPHEN R. BING & S. STEPHEN ROSENFELD, THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE IN
(1970).
532 U.S at 351.
Id. at 349.

THE LOWER COURTS OF METROPOLITAN BOSTON

395.
396.
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about officer safety. In both detention centers and on the street, a
mistake—for example, the failure to locate a concealed weapon—could
be fatal. That is a risk worth avoiding even at high cost to personal
dignity.
A rule barring custodial arrests for minor offenses should have no
negative consequences for officer safety. In fact, such a rule may
actually enhance officer safety because the suspect who is not being
taken into custody has less reason to resist arrest and fewer opportunities
to do so.
D.

The Bottom Line

Often, where balancing tests are used, there is no easy answer to the
question of what is the proper balance. Once the relevant factors are
identified, the weight to be assigned to each factor depends on the value
system and preferences of the person doing the weighing. In this
instance, though, the balance is clear; the Court simply reached the
wrong result.
In Tennessee v. Garner, 397 the Court held that deadly force may not
be used to arrest a suspect simply because there is probable cause to
believe that she committed a felony. 398 The state had argued that if the
probable cause requirement “is satisfied the Fourth Amendment has
nothing to say about how that seizure is made.” 399 This argument, said
the Court:
ignores the many cases in which this Court, by balancing the extent of
the intrusion against the need for it, has examined the reasonableness
of the manner in which a search or seizure is conducted. To determine
the constitutionality of a seizure “[w]e must balance the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify
the intrusion.” . . . We have described “the balancing of competing
interests” as “the key principle of the Fourth Amendment.” . . .
Because one of the factors is the extent of the intrusion, it is plain that
reasonableness depends on not only when a seizure is made, but also

397. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
398. Id. at 11-12. At issue in Garner was a Tennessee statute which, as interpreted, permitted a
police officer to “use all . . . necessary means to effect the arrest” of a felon. Operating pursuant to this
statute, and in accordance with the slightly more restrictive policy of the Memphis police department, a
Memphis police officer shot and killed a fleeing burglary suspect in order to prevent the suspect’s escape.
Subsequent investigation revealed that the suspect was unarmed. Id. at 4-5.
399. Id. at 7 (internal citations omitted).
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In holding that the suspect’s father had a cause of action against the
City of Memphis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court concluded:
[T]he use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects,
whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not
better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Where the
suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others,
the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the
401
use of deadly force to do so.

In a similar vein, it is not better that all minor offenders go to jail
than that they escape. Where the offense is minor and the suspect poses
no immediate threat, the harm resulting from failing to take him into
custody does not justify the impact of a custodial arrest. Jails are not
nice places; they can be dangerous places, as Florence acknowledges.
The Atwater court failed to recognize, or at least failed to give sufficient
weight to, the profound consequences of a custodial arrest and its
sequels. 402 Dire consequences to the arrestee may be a reasonable,
acceptable risk where the crime is serious and the public interest in
apprehending and incarcerating the offender is great. However, where
the crime is minor, and, in particular, where it is a non-jailable offense, it
is unreasonable to subject presumptively innocent people to such
consequences. 403
The Atwater Court erred because it failed to take into account the
seriousness of the offense at issue. The seriousness of the crime is
relevant in virtually every area of criminal procedure.404 Every
400. Id. at 7-8.
401. Id. at 11.
402. See infra notes 273 to 303 and accompanying text.
403. See Mendelson, supra note 113, at 502, 505 (citing cases where individuals were
“arrested, handcuffed, searched, and jailed” for minor traffic violations and noting the
“unreasonableness of arresting someone for a trivial traffic offense since it is not a crime [and], the
penalty is only a fine”).
404. Courts have looked to the seriousness of the offense in a wide range of settings outside
the obvious areas of bail, sentencing, and parole. See e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738,
740 n.3 (1994) (sentencing); United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315-16 (1986) (“In
assessing the . . . reasonableness of [the government’s interlocutory appeal] courts may consider
several factors [including] . . . —in some cases—the seriousness of the crime. . . . Moreover, the
charged offense usually must be sufficiently serious to justify restraints that may be imposed on the
defendant pending the outcome of the appeal.”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158-62 (1968)
(the right to jury trial in state court only applies where a defendant is charged with a serious
offense); People v. Edelbacher, 766 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1989) (the seriousness of the offense is relevant
to whether a motion for change of venue should be granted); State v. Mouser, 714 S.W.2d 851, 857
(Mo. App. 1986) (the seriousness of the offense is a factor in whether a juvenile should be tried as
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jurisdiction distinguishes among crimes by assigning different penalties
for various offenses. “[T]he penalty that may attach to any particular
offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication of
the State’s interest in arresting individuals suspected of committing that
offense.” 405 In most of cases of minor regulatory criminality, the
maximum penalty that can be imposed by a judicial officer, if the
arrestee is found or pleads guilty, will be a small fine. 406 The Atwater
Court failed to recognize that the minor penalties the law imposes for
minor crimes reflects the relative unimportance society attaches to the
apprehension and conviction of persons suspected of such crimes.
In Garner, the Court acknowledged the government’s “interests in
effective law enforcement,” but said:
[W]e are not convinced that the use of deadly force is a sufficiently
productive means of accomplishing them to justify the killing of
nonviolent suspects . . . . The use of deadly force is a self-defeating
way of apprehending a suspect and so setting the criminal justice
mechanism in motion. If successful, it guarantees that that mechanism
407
will not be set in motion.

Custodial arrest of “minor” offenders is often similarly
unproductive. In her dissent in Atwater, Justice O’Connor said that the
majority “recognizes that the [custodial] arrest of Gail Atwater was a
‘pointless indignity’ that served no discernible state interest.”408 In fact,
taking minor offenders into custody is often counterproductive in terms
of other law enforcement needs. Booking suspects is an expensive 409
and time consuming-process that takes police officers off the streets.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court has observed, “[t]he processing of
misdemeanors, in particular, and the early stages of prosecution
generally, [are] . . . marked by delays that can seriously affect the quality
of justice.” 410 Loading the system with more cases will not help solve
that problem. 411 “[T]here . . . are public interests in not incarcerating
an adult); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36-40 (1972) (the right to appointed counsel
only attaches if the defendant is to be sentenced to incarceration).
405. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336 (2001) (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740, 754 n.14 (1984).
406. Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 441 (7th Cir. 1986).
407. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1985).
408. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 361 (2001).
409. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 173 (2008) (quoting Dep’t of Justice, NIJ, Issues and
Practices, Citation release (Mar. 1984) (describing costs savings as a principal benefit of citation
release)).
410. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 n.23 (1975).
411. In some counties, jailors will not book minor traffic offenders if they are brought into the
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persons accused of minor regulatory offenses [who cannot make bail]
solely on account of their indigency and in not exacerbating existing
problems of prison overcrowding.” 412 Finally, if fewer resources were
devoted to the pursuit of minor criminality, more resources would be
available to pursue serious offenders. 413
In Florence, if a custodial arrest had not been made, the
consequences would have been simple. The error that led to Florence’s
arrest would eventually have been discovered and corrected, and he
could have gone on with his life unmolested by law enforcement. The
government would have saved the time and money required to process
and hold Florence (not to mention the time and money required to
defend his law suit). No law enforcement interest would have been
compromised in any way.
At bottom, custodial arrests for offenses that carry no possibility of
imprisonment are unreasonable for one simple reason: the costs imposed
on the offender by the arrest and its sequels greatly exceed the penalties
the legislature has authorized judges to impose on persons convicted of
the offense after their guilt has been proved in a court beyond a
reasonable doubt. Atwater allows police officers to circumvent the
expressed will of the legislature, and the protections available in court,
and, on the basis of probable cause, unilaterally impose as a penalty the
draconian consequences of a custodial arrest and its consequences. In
most instances, this “penalty” is totally disproportionate to the harm the
offender and his offense might have caused. For these reasons, a
custodial arrest for a non-jailable offense is an unreasonable means of
advancing a relatively minor societal interest if an alternative, such as
the issuance of a citation or notice to appear, is available.414
Finally, the Atwater Court erred because it failed to take into

jail after a custodial arrest. Interview with Assistant State’s Attorney (formerly Deputy Sheriff)
Marty Beltz, Perry County, Illinois (Jan. 14, 2013).
412. See State v. Hurtado, 529 A.2d 1000, 1008 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div, 1987) (Skillman, J.,
dissenting), rev’d, 549 A.2d 428 (N.J. 1998).
413. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352 (“[T]he use of custodial arrests for minor offenses
‘[a]ctually contradicts [l]aw [e]nforcement interests.’”) (quoting Brief of the Inst. on Criminal
Justice at the Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. and Eleven Leading Experts on Law Enforcement and Corr.
Admin. and Pol’y as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 11 Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 (No. 991408), 2000 WL 1341293).
414. Whether custodial arrests are also unreasonable for offenses punishable by a short jail
term is a more difficult question. Cf. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336 (2001) (distinguishing
the offense at issue in McArthur from the offense at issue in Welsh by noting that the offense in
McArthur, unlike that in Welsh, was punishable by up to thirty days in jail). It may be significant,
though, that very few minor offenders are sentenced to jail time upon conviction. Florence v. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1524 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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account the pervasive regulation of vehicles 415 (which renders nearly
impossible compliance with all traffic laws),416 and the resultant
consequences of its ruling on search and seizure law. It is no
exaggeration to say that after Atwater the police have the power to stop
every motorist almost at will, search him or her, take him or her into
custody, impound the vehicle, and search it. Arbitrary stops of vehicles
were rejected by the Court in Delaware v. Prouse.417 Now those stops
are back. This result is contrary to the intentions of the Framers. 418
“The suspicionless search is the very evil the Fourth Amendment was
intended to stamp out. The pre-revolutionary ‘writs of assistance’ . . .
were reviled precisely because they placed the liberty of every man in
the hands of every petty officer.” 419
In a very real sense, Atwater and Whren together amount to an
almost total nullification of the Fourth Amendment in most settings
outside the home. 420 This result should be intolerable in any society that
claims to respect individual freedom and to be governed by the rule of
law.
VI. REASONABLENESS, PROPORTIONALITY, AND COMMON SENSE
The criminal justice system as a whole is a continuum where the
more compelling the government’s interest, and the greater the quantity
and quality of evidence in the government’s possession, the greater the
consequences it can impose on the individual.421 In addition, as the
415. The Supreme Court has often referred to the pervasive regulation of vehicles as a reason
for recognizing a reduced expectation of privacy in vehicles. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471
U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)).
416. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) (observing that it was argued that “the
‘multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations’ is so large and so difficult to obey
perfectly that virtually everyone is guilty of violation, permitting the police to single out almost
whomever they wish for a stop”).
417. 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (absent reasonable suspicion, police officers may not stop
motorists to check their driver’s licenses or registration and may not use other methods that involve
the unrestrained exercise of discretion). See also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 4142 (2000) (vehicle checkpoints directed at ordinary crime, rather than crimes that specifically
implicate the lawful use of the roadways, are unconstitutional).
418. Sklansky, supra note 26, at 1813-14.
419. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 858 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal
quotations omitted).
420. See Davies, supra note 27, at 246, 247.
421. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (referring to “the ‘continuum’ of state imposed
punishments”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 379 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Criminal law has traditionally recognized a distinction between essentially
regulatory offenses and serious violations of the peace, and [has] graduated the response of the
criminal justice system [accordingly].”).
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consequences of the government’s actions impact more severely on the
individual, more and more protections are available to that person.
Fourth Amendment law follows this pattern. 422 Some seizures have
been said to be so minimal in their impact, and the interests advanced by
them so important, that no evidence at all is necessary. 423 A small
amount of evidence—reasonable suspicion 424—justifies a brief
detention, 425 or a limited protective intrusion. 426 A greater amount of
evidence 427—probable cause (and sometimes a warrant)—justifies an
arrest or a full scale search. 428 A still greater quantity of evidence—
clear and convincing—can, after a hearing, justify preventive

422. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1985) (relying on the balancing of interests
that is “the key principle of the Fourth Amendment” to hold that the use of deadly force is
“constitutionally unreasonable” unless the officer also has “probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others”).
423. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (per curiam) (requiring a
driver to step out of the car after a traffic stop did not require reasonable suspicion because “this
additional intrusion . . . [was] de minimus” and justified by the state interest in officer safety);
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997) (ordering passenger out of the car was a “minimal”
additional intrusion and did not require reasonable suspicion).
424. United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[R]easonable
suspicion may exist ‘even if it is more likely than not that the individual is not involved in any
illegality.’”) (quoting United States v. Albert, 579 F.3d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 2009)).
425. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2002); see also Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (in determining the reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than
traditional arrests, courts should consider “the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure,
the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with
individual liberty”).
In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), the Court held that a brief seizure of a
homeowner while his home was searched for narcotics was justified by the need to prevent the
homeowner’s flight if incriminating evidence was found, and by the necessity of protecting the
police, other persons and the property from harm. Id. at 702-03. The Summers Court said that
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967), Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1971), and United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), “recognize that some seizures admittedly covered by the
Fourth Amendment constitute such limited intrusions on the personal security of those detained, and
are justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they may be made on less evidence
than probable cause, so long as the police have an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity.”
Summers, 452 U.S. at 699.
426. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (holding that “the proper balance” requires “that there be
a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons” where an officer has stopped
an individual whom “he has reason to believe” on the basis of “specific reasonable inferences” is
“armed and dangerous . . . regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a
crime,” to conduct a search for weapons “limited in scope to this protective purpose”).
427. Though somewhat misleading, the phrase “greater” evidence is consistent with the phrase
“lesser” quantum of evidence which the Court recently used in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
878 n.4 (1987), in distinguishing the nature of the belief which would justify a search based on
reasonable suspicion from the nature of the belief which would justify a search based on probable
cause.
428. See supra notes 146 to 224 and accompanying text.
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detention. 429 Still more evidence—proof beyond a reasonable doubt—
can, after a trial, justify life imprisonment or even death.
A similar continuum seemed to be developing with respect to
seizures and examinations of things. The Court upheld some police
actions by viewing them as so minor they did not infringe on any
constitutionally protected interest, 430 or by viewing them as “very
limited” searches necessary under the circumstances 431 or “to preserve
highly evanescent evidence.” 432 Then, in Arizona v. Hicks, 433 the Court
refused to recognize a category of minimally intrusive searches or
cursory inspections, which could be justified on the basis of reasonable
suspicion. 434
Hicks arose out of the action of police officers who legally entered
429. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (upholding the
constitutionality of preventive detention under a statute which permits the detention of an arrestee
where the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that the arrestee “presents an
identified and articulable threat to an individual or [to] the community . . . ”).
430. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (“[N]o expectation of privacy was
violated” when police officers, acting without a warrant, took a paint scraping from the exterior of
defendant’s car (which had been left in a public parking lot) and examined a tire on a wheel on that
same car for the purpose of comparing it with tire tracks left on the ground at a crime scene.).
431. See, e.g., United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252-53 (1970) (unanimously
ruling that it was reasonable for authorities to seize from the mail two suspicious packages (which
had been sent registered mail), and without opening them, detain them for twenty-nine hours until a
search warrant could be obtained was permissible because the detention was relatively brief and was
no longer than was necessary for the authorities to confirm their suspicions and obtain a warrant).
It is difficult to determine whether the Van Leeuwen Court viewed the detention of the package as
so inconsequential that it simply did not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment activity, or
whether the Court felt that the Fourth Amendment was implicated, but viewed the seizure as
reasonable. Language in the Court’s opinion lends support to both conclusions. In two different
places, Justice Douglas specifically stated that the detention of the packages resulted in no invasion
of any interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. In another place, he stated that “detention of
mail could at some point become an unreasonable seizure.” Id. at 252. At the conclusion of its
opinion, the Court stated that given the suspicious nature of the packages, and the unavoidable delay
in obtaining a warrant, the detention was not “unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 253.
432. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (while Murphy was briefly
detained, though not arrested, on the basis of probable cause to believe he had murdered his wife, it
was constitutionally permissible for the police to take a sample of scrapings from his fingernail
against his wishes and without a warrant).
433. 480 U.S. 321 (1987). The Hicks Court characterized United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696
(1983) (as well as United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), and United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)), as all involving the seizure of objects (vehicles in Cortez and
Brignoni-Ponce and luggage in Place) and cited them as examples of situations where “minimally
intrusive” seizures “on less than probable cause” were upheld because “operational necessities”
rendered them “the only practicable means of detecting certain types of crime.” Hicks, 480 U.S. at
327.
434. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 327-38; cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (allowing
warrantless searches of school children on the basis of reasonable suspicion).
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a squalid apartment from which shots had been fired. 435 Once inside,
one of the officers noticed two sets of expensive stereo components.436
Suspecting they were stolen, the officer moved some of the equipment to
examine the serial numbers. 437 Eventually, it was learned that the
equipment was stolen and Hicks was charged with armed robbery. 438
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that the
mere recording of the numbers was not a search but it also held that the
movement of the equipment was an unreasonable search or seizure
because it was not based on probable cause and was not justified as part
of the initial entry. 439 The Court concluded that an item in plain view
could not be seized except on the basis of probable cause unless “the
seizure is minimally intrusive and operational necessities render it the
only practicable means of detecting certain types of crime.” 440
Despite its insistence that “[n]othing in the prior opinions of . . .
[the Supreme] Court supports a distinction” between full blown and
cursory searches, 441 the Hicks majority ignored both Fourth Amendment
theory and “a substantial body” 442 of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence 443 in order to establish a wholly unnecessary bright line
test which, whatever its abstract appeal, makes very little sense as a real
world proposition. Many officers, faced with what some will see as a
highly technical rule with little to commend it, may find it difficult to
resist the temptation to move items to obtain needed information and
then recall later that the information was in plain view and that obtaining
it required no movement. Unlike a wrongfully seized or wrongfully
searched person, who can counter an officer’s testimony with his or her
own testimony, an inanimate object has no such ability.
This invitation to perjury is wholly unnecessary. 444 In other
435. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 323-24.
439. Id. at 324-25.
440. Id. at 327. The majority claimed it was adhering “to the textual and traditional standard
of probable cause.” Id. at 329. Cf. Silas Wasserstrom & Louis Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L. J. 19, 24-25 (1988) (arguing that the Hicks Court, despite
implicitly conceding that the officer’s conduct was reasonable, “slavishly adhere[d] to a series of
rules relating to warrants and probable cause that have no basis in constitutional text”).
441. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 329.
442. Id. at 339 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
443. None of the opinions in Hicks cited Van Leeuwen or Murphy.
444. The Court should not assume officers will perjure themselves. See People v. Berrios, 270
N.E.2d 709, 713 (N.Y. 1971). However, police officers are human beings, who often see
themselves engaged in a “war” on crime. The Court should be realistic about how they will behave
just as legislatures, when passing laws like the national fifty-five mile per hour speed limit, should
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situations, the Court has responded to real world needs and realities and
recognized the necessity of distinguishing between stops and arrests and
between frisks and searches. The practical difficulties in drawing a line
between “full-blown” and cursory searches are minimal by comparison.
A principled and relatively clear distinction can easily be made between
a surface inspection of an object, even one that requires moving it a few
inches, and the opening of a container or the rummaging through or
among multiple objects. 445 By failing to make this distinction, and
treating minimally intrusive activities as if they were full-scale searches
or seizures, the majority “trivializes the Fourth Amendment,” and
“handicap[s] law enforcement without enhancing privacy.” 446
The result in Hicks, like that in Atwater, is utterly “contrary to the
idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice.”447
Taken together, Hicks, Atwater, and Florence, suggest that the Court, in
its quest to formulate bright line rules, has lost all sense of
proportionality and balance. In effect, any person can be stopped at any
time for a minor traffic violation, taken into custody and subjected to all
that can follow; but an inanimate, unfeeling object cannot be moved a
few inches without probable cause and without a warrant.448 Putting the
matter in a different setting, the police can come to a person’s home and
wait there for nineteen hours while they obtain a search warrant,449 but
they cannot move the stereo nineteen millimeters while they wait.
VII. DETERMINING THE PURPOSE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT ACTIVITIES
If the seriousness of the offense under investigation is to be relevant
to the propriety of Fourth Amendment activities, it will frequently be
necessary for police officers to know, and courts to determine, that
purpose. In practice, police and prosecutors often “make up front
judgments about the seriousness of alleged crimes.”450 In many cases,
however, an officer on the street might not have a clear idea what crime
he is investigating.
Determinations of purpose will usually be easier in arrest cases than
be realistic about how people will behave.
445. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 336-37 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
446. Id. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting).
447. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) (referring to the impact of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule in some instances).
448. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 440, at 49 (observing that “it is far from clear
that the need for a proper educational environment which moved the Court in T.L.O. is greater than
the need to catch burglars which left it unmoved in Hicks”).
449. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
450. Stuntz, supra note 190, at 870.
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in search cases. Arrests must be made for a specific offense. Even if the
offense for which a suspect is arrested is not the offense with which the
arresting officer was most concerned, the offense for which the arrest is
made provides some indication of the arresting officer’s motives. Where
an arrest warrant is obtained prior to an arrest, advance notice of the
offense for which the arrest will be made will have been given in the
course of obtaining the warrant.
In search cases it will often be impossible to state in advance the
offense toward which the search is directed. “[M]ost searches occur at
an early stage of the prosecutorial process, long before the severity of
the crime is known with certainty.” 451 If there is probable cause to
associate particular items with criminal activity, but uncertainty as to the
precise crime to which they relate, a search is justified.452 As a result, in
search cases it will often not be possible to factor the seriousness of the
offense into the probable cause equation.
Whatever the actual goal of a particular search, the experience in
the stop and frisk area suggests that after the fact the police will say they
were looking for whatever would be permissible or for whatever would
justify the most intrusive search. 453 Some control over this reality may
be possible where a search warrant is used, because the necessity of
applying for a warrant at least ensures that a record is made of some of
the information on which the determination to search is based.
Moreover, a warrant will sometimes specify the offense to which the
items sought relate.454 Often, however, “search warrants are employed
451. Ronald J. Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux, The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause,
1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763, 795-96.
452. See, e.g., People v. Casillo, 425 N.E.2d 1379, 1382 (Ill. App. 1981)
In the instant case, too, there was probable cause to believe that one of two particular
offenses, i.e. murder or failure to report an accident involving death, had occurred.
Assuming arguendo, that the complaint for the search warrant did not state probable
cause to believe that the offense which the officers were investigating[,] murder[,] had
occurred, the complaint nevertheless clearly revealed probable cause to believe that the
particular offense of failure to report an accident involving death had been committed.
Id.
453. John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1047 (1974)
(“[R]egardless of what they find, policemen almost always claim to be looking for weapons.”); cf.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1967) (refusing to accept police officer’s statements
that he was searching for the suspect or for stolen money, and concluding that he must have been
searching for weapons).
454. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1473 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A] federal
search warrant must be based upon a showing of probable cause that a federal crime has been
committed and that evidence of that crime is present on the premises to be searched.”); cf. United
States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492, 495 (1st Cir. 1979) (“[I]t is our collective opinion that there
probable cause to believe that James F. Melvin was responsible for the explosion at Rooney’s
Tavern and respectfully request that the Court issue search warrant for Melvin’s white Cadillac,
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early in a investigation . . . perhaps before the identity of any likely
criminal [or the exact crime suspected] . . . could be known.” 455
Where no warrant is obtained, it will often be difficult to determine
the purpose of a search except on the basis of law enforcement’s after
the fact statements and the results obtained.456 The offense for which the
suspect is ultimately prosecuted, though not irrelevant, will rarely
provide a clear indication of the purpose of the search because
prosecutors have wide discretion, 457 and because, in many cases, the
offense that law enforcement believed was occurring will not turn out to
Finally,
be the offense that was actually occurring. 458
in some cases, a search will yield nothing incriminating. In these, and
perhaps in some other cases, “the court would simply have to take the
policeman’s word as to what crime he was investigating.” 459
VIII. CONCLUSION
The seriousness of the crime is relevant in virtually every area of
criminal procedure. 460 However, in its quest for bright line rules, the
Court has chosen to ignore the seriousness of the offense in Fourth
Amendment equations. Where officer safety is at issue, this is the
correct result.
The overriding goal of any police officer or correctional officer is
to make it home safely at the end of his or her shift. Rules that advance
officer safety enable officers to do their duty with less fear and
legitimize activities that some officers might feel were necessary even if
they were not legal. 461 It is therefore not surprising that the Court has
consistently recognized and ruled that the seriousness of the offense is
Mass. Reg. D66-105” and “for James Melvin’s residence at 38 Ells Avenue, Weymouth,
Massachusetts.”); Casillo, 425 N.E.2d at 1382 (“[T]here is no constitutional requirement that the
crime under investigation be named in the complaint or affidavit for search warrant.”).
455. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 561 (1978).
456. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (“[A]n after-the-event justification for the . . .
search . . . [is] too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight
judgment.”).
457. See Dripps, supra note 171, at 1426 & n.19.
458. See Bacigal, supra note 451, at 796 (citing examples).
459. Kaplan, supra note 453, at 1047.
460. See supra note 404 (citing cases).
461. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1997) (officer who makes a traffic
stop may order a passenger out of the vehicle); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967); cf. United States v.
Soyka, 394 F.2d 443, 454 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (suggesting that it might be
appropriate, in some Fourth Amendment settings, to focus on the gravity of the offense as well as
the utility of the police action for purposes other than securing a conviction), cert denied, 393 U.S.
1095 (1969).
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not relevant in assessing, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the threat to
officer safety posed by a person in custody. 462
The picture is different where officer safety is not an issue and the
purpose of a Fourth Amendment activity is simply law enforcement.463
Here, the seriousness of the offense under investigation is highly
relevant to the propriety of many actions. The balancing of interests
inherent in the Fourth Amendment is, itself, a sufficient, if not a
compelling, argument for distinguishing between or among various
Fourth Amendment activities on the basis of the seriousness of the
offense. The Court’s unwillingness to recognize this fact has put great
strain on the Fourth Amendment and has led to decisions such as
Atwater and Hicks whose artificiality offends common sense,
“complicates the police officer’s task,” 464 and is “contrary to the idea of
proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice.” 465
In a broad sense, consideration of the seriousness of the offense
would mean that a wide range of Fourth Amendment activities directed
toward minor offenses would, in general, be viewed less sympathetically
because of the government’s reduced interest in convicting people of
those offenses. 466 Conversely, Fourth Amendment activities directed
toward more serious offenses, or motivated by more serious concerns,
would, in general, be viewed more sympathetically. 467 Factoring the
462. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332 (2009).
463. Compare Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (barring strip
search of school girl for contraband pills) with Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (allowing strip search of
detainees).
464. Bellin, supra note 216, at 38.
465. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976).
466. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court’s Turn Toward a General Reasonableness Interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 138 (1989) [hereinafter The Court’s Turn
Toward a General Reasonableness Interpretation]; see also Folk, supra note 113, at 331 (“The
state’s interest in solving a crime should be a function of the seriousness of the crime; so the state’s
interest in investigating crimes should decrease as the seriousness of the crime diminishes.”).
It could also be argued that where minor offenses are concerned, the reduced consequences to the
individual render the intrusion less hostile and hence more readily justified. Cf. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, supra note 57, at 342 (stating, in the context of stop and frisk theory, that “it may be
postulated that less evidence is needed to meet the probable cause test when the consequences for
the individual are less serious”); see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
467. See, e.g., Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1406 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring) (noting the notorious difficulties in defining reasonableness and observing that
“[r]easonableness is an open-ended approach . . . [which] calls for an objective balancing of the
harms from the arrest or search against the potential harms to effective law enforcement of delaying
the action or not acting at all. The graver the crime and the more exigent the circumstances, the
more the police can do—whether that means searching on a lesser probability of finding something,
entering a dwelling at night, or tearing a house apart in search of evidence.”), cert. denied, 475 U.S.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss2/2

78

Schroeder: Factoring the Seriousness
ARTICLE 2 - SCHROEDER (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

FACTORING THE SERIOUSNESS

4/5/2013 6:40 PM

409

seriousness of the offense into Fourth Amendment equations does not
require case-by-case analysis.
It can, and should, be done
categorically. 468 The exact categories of offenses and the exact places
where lines might be drawn is something on which reasonable people
can differ. 469 One author suggests five categories. 470 Another author
suggests three categories. 471 In Welsh v. Wisconsin, 472 the Court seemed
to suggest four categories. 473 The important thing is that the rules be
easily understood 474 and their application be limited primarily to
situations where they give the officer a simple choice between “yes” and
“no.” 475
Eventually, the Court will have to change course. The catalyst for
that change could take several forms. First, change could come when
the Court is faced with an exceptionally intrusive search or seizure such
as the one at issue in Winston v. Lee, 476 where the Court considered
whether, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an individual suspected
of armed robbery could be compelled to undergo surgery under general
anesthetic in order to retrieve a bullet lodged in his shoulder which there
was probable cause to believe would be useful evidence against him. 477

1123 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding “Fourth Amendment standards govern all excessive force in arrest claims”); see also
Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the seriousness of the crime
under investigation “may affect the judgment of what is reasonable [police behavior]”); State v.
Flowers, 441 So. 2d 707, 713 n.1 (La. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 945 (1984) (“[H]eightened
public interest in the case of serious or violent crimes can tip the scales in favor of the
reasonableness of the police conduct.”); see also Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 440, at 47
(observing that a fully rational approach to search and seizure problems “would allow consideration
of degrees of probability and incorporate other considerations as well such as . . . the seriousness of
the crime under investigation”).
468. Schroeder, The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra note 188, at 488-498; see also
Bellin, supra note 216, at 37.
469. See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 352 (2001) (observing that at least three
categories were proposed there); see also Schroeder, The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra note
188 (discussing different ways to categorize crimes).
470. Stuntz, supra note 190, at 870.
471. Bellin, supra note 216, at 30-31 (suggesting three categories of crimes, grave, serious,
and minor).
472. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
473. See Schroeder, The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra note 188, at 500.
474. See id. at 505, 508 (jailable and non-jailable is “clear and obvious” while the felonymisdemeanor distinction “has the apparent virtue of being obvious and well known”).
475. See e.g., Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests, supra note 228.
476. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
477. Id. at 766. The Lee Court observed that the police “plainly had probable cause to conduct
the search” and observed that a judge had in fact authorized it after an adversary hearing. Id. at 763
& n.6.
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In an opinion which relied heavily on Schmerber v. California,478 the
Winston Court weighed the nature and risks of the operation, noted that
the state had other substantial evidence of Winston’s guilt and had not
demonstrated “a compelling need” for the bullet, and found that the
proposed surgery would be unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 479
Justice Brennan’s opinion for the majority observed that the
reasonableness of such intrusions depends on a case-by-case approach,
in which the individual’s interests in privacy and security are weighed
against society’s interests in conducting the procedure. 480 The Court did
not expressly state that the seriousness of the offense was a relevant
factor in determining reasonableness,481 but his test certainly suggests
that the operation might have been allowed if there had been little other
478. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Although Schmerber suggests that minor intrusions are permissible
even where relatively minor offenses are concerned, the Schmerber Court gave no indication of
whether such invasive searches would be permitted if extremely minor offenses such as underage
drinking were involved. Cf. Hoyle v. State, 268 S.W.3d 313, 320 (Ark. 2007) (under ARK RULE
CRIM P. 12.3, which provides that searches of an accused’s blood stream, body cavities, and
subcutaneous tissue, are permitted if they are reasonable “under the circumstances of the case,
including the seriousness of the offense and the nature of the intrusion,” it was constitutionally
reasonable for the police to take of blood and urine samples from motorist involved in accident that
caused two fatalities).
At the other end of scale, Schmerber did not say whether a “clear indication” of the
searches likely success that the Court required would still be required if an extremely serious
offense were involved.
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), the Court relied on
Schmerber to uphold the use of blood tests to detect drug use without even requiring individualized
suspicion. In addition, the Skinner Court upheld, under the same criteria, breath tests and urine
tests. Id. at 625.
479. 470 U.S. at 766-67. Prior to Lee most courts generally distinguished between surgical
searches under general anesthesia (which were generally barred) and those under local anesthesia
(which were generally permitted if reasonable. See Leonard Mandell & L. Anita Richardson,
Surgical Search: Removing a Scar on the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 525,
527, 546-52 (1984) (citing cases and proposing a per se bar on searches under general anesthesia
and strict limits on those under local anesthesia).
480. Justice Brennan also wrote the opinion in Schmerber.
481. Cf. The Court’s Turn Toward a General Reasonableness Interpretation, supra note 466,
at 138 (suggesting that Lee implicitly recognized that the seriousness of the offense is relevant to
reasonableness analysis.).
Prior to Lee, almost all surgical search cases involved very serious offenses. See e.g.,
United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (murder and robbery), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1062 (1977); Hughes v. United States, 429 A.2d 1339, 1339 (D.C. App. 1981) (murder and
armed robbery) (upholding surgery); Doe v. State, 409 So. 2d 25, 27-28 (Fla. App. 1982) (on
rehearing) (per curiam) (murder and armed robbery) (upholding surgery); State v. Martin, 404 So.
2d 960, 961 (La. 1981) (second degree murder); State v. Richards, 585 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. App.
1979) (first degree murder) (upholding surgery to remove bullet lodged in hip); cf. People v.
Adams, 299 N.E.2d 834, 835 (Ind. 1973) (murder) (disallowing surgery and adopting per se rule
barring such surgery), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
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evidence and a compelling need for the bullet. It would seem absurd,
however, to allow such a surgical search to extract a bullet to prove that
someone was guilty of unlawful discharge of a firearm within the city
limits. 482
Second, the Court may be forced to confront the seriousness of the
offense problem in a roadblock type case. As previously noted, in these
cases, the Court has relied on “a balancing test to determine Fourth
Amendment reasonableness.” 483 In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the
Court held that roadblocks could not be directed at ordinary criminality
not connected in some way with the use of the highways. 484 The Court
observed, however, that “the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly
permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent
terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by
way of a particular route.” 485 In Illinois v. Lidster, the Court held that
highway checkpoints to obtain information from possible witnesses to a
fatal hit and run accident were reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment 486 because the “[p]olice were investigating a crime that had
resulted in a human death. . . . The stop advanced this grave public
concern to a significant degree.” 487
Reasonable people can dispute where the line should drawn but a
line must be drawn somewhere. As Justice Jackson observed years ago
in his dissenting opinion in Brinegar v. United States: 488
[I]f we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment . . . ,
it seems to me they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the
offense. If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped [sic] and
the officers throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and search
every outgoing car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of
the search. . . . However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain such
an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be
reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way
to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not
strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a few
489
bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.

482. Because most, if not all, surgical searches are made with a warrant, and the crime is
known, the administrability objections that were raised in Atwater should not be relevant.
483. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001) (citing cases).
484. 531 U.S. 32, 39-44 (2001).
485. Id. at 44.
486. 540 U.S. 419, 426-27 (2004).
487. Id. at 427.
488. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
489. Id. at 183 (Jackson, J. dissenting).
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Third, the Court may also be forced to confront the seriousness of
the offense issue because “new technology allows the government to
replace traditional surveillance techniques with far more comprehensive
means of gathering information.” 490 In either event, the balancing of
interests which underlies the notion of reasonableness suggests that the
Fourth Amendment requires special constraints on the power to search
or seize when the State seeks to engage in exceptionally intrusive
activities 491 or activities which impact on an area in which our society
recognizes significantly heightened privacy or other interests.
Finally, the Court may be forced to confront the seriousness of the
offense issue because the results and unintended consequences of
Atwater are so draconian that the decision cannot be allowed to stand. 492
Their impact on the law of search and seizure is such that the Court in a
very real sense totally nullified the Fourth Amendment in most settings
outside the home. 493
Reasonableness is the core concern of the Fourth Amendment.
Custodial arrests for offenses that carry no possibility of imprisonment
are unreasonable for one very simple reason; the costs imposed by the
arrest are often greater than those authorized by the legislature for
persons convicted of these offenses. Proper emphasis on the seriousness
of the offense, and on the fact that the “balancing of conflicting values”
is “the key principle of the [F]ourth [A]mendment,” 494 would enhance
individual privacy interests 495 and provides the flexibility necessary to
respond to such modern problems as terrorism and ever advancing
technology.

490. Bellin, supra note 216, at 41.
491. See, e.g, Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985).
492. See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 773 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(expressing hope that the Court will reconsider its decision in Atwater “if experience demonstrates
‘anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor- offense arrests’”) (quoting Atwater v. Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001)).
493. See Davies, supra note 27, at 246-47.
494. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701 (1981).
495. It has been observed that most Fourth Amendment violations occur in the victimless
crime area. See authorities cited in Kathleen Bach, Note, The Exclusionary Rule in The Public
School Administrative Disciplinary Proceeding: Answering The Question After New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 37 HAST. L.J. 1133, 1152 n.119 (1986).
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